The EU’s China strategy, while avoiding Trump-style confrontation, puts European unity to the test
- While it won’t challenge China as Trump has done, the grouping wants to address its concerns over some Chinese policies through a united front. Italy’s lone endorsement of the belt and road shows the challenge it now faces
The EU is ready to cooperate with China on many fronts, especially on promoting multilateralism, which is being challenged by US President Donald Trump’s trade protectionism and erratic diplomacy.
But European leaders also noted that the “strategic” cooperation between the bloc and China was unbalanced because of the latter’s market-distorting practices, and needed to be recalibrated. Significantly, Juncker said last week that Sino-European relations were “good, but not excellent”.
The European grouping, which is China’s largest trading partner, is already trying to rebalance relations with the Asian giant.
The union is also considering a mechanism to force the Chinese to grant reciprocal access to their market, especially on public procurement tenders.
EU institutions and some member countries argue that the belt and road project is not in compliance with European standards on investment financing, labour and environmental protection, also lamenting the excessive role of Chinese state-owned companies in it.
Western powers warned that China’s activities and presence in Italian seaports might jeopardise their security interests, as well as those of the EU and Nato. These concerns extended to possible Chinese investments in Italy’s critical technologies, including next-generation mobile networks.
All that said, European leaders made it clear to Xi that the grouping did not want to confront China in a Trump-style way. Europe’s soft attitude towards security issues related to China is symptomatic of its unwillingness to ratchet up the tension with the Chinese.
Furthermore, the document emphasised that China’s growing military capabilities, along with its ambition to have the technologically most-advanced armed forces by 2050, presented security challenges for the EU “already in a short- to mid-term perspective”.
But possibility is one thing. The reality is another.
When asked if the union was considering freedom of navigation operations in the disputed South China Sea, while rethinking its response to China’s growing power, an EU spokesperson told me that “both in terms of competence and capacity, any freedom of navigation patrols would be [a matter] for EU member states”.
Next month’s China-EU summit will help us understand if the new European strategy on China has strength or is simply bureaucratic wording with no substance.
Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst