Why the unhappy legacy of US colonialism in Southeast Asia should be a lesson to China
Southeast Asian nations, because of their colonial experience, are sensitive to real or imagined slights. Although China is different from their former colonial masters, it must tread carefully in expanding its influence in the region
As China’s power and influence grow, so does the glare of the spotlight on its behaviour towards other nations and cultures. The conduct of nations and their citizens overseas is part of their soft power: the capability to assert their economic or cultural influence and shape the preferences of others. The management of hard power, including military might, and soft power constitutes political influence.
China has achieved considerable success increasing its soft power in Southeast Asia. But there are some early warning signs that it may eventually repeat some of the worst mistakes of the West there. Indeed, it must be careful that the goodwill it covets does not dissipate through neglect or mismanagement of its soft power.
Back when Western countries dominated the region, they colonised Southeast Asian cultures. They generally treated the indigenous peoples with cultural ignorance and arrogance. That attitude of cultural superiority would come back to haunt the French in Vietnam, the Dutch in Indonesia and the Americans in the Philippines, just to name a few countries that cast off the shackles of colonialism.
Some argue that former colonies were improved by the colonial experience – the Western development of infrastructure, and administrative and educational systems. But such so-called benefits did not soothe the souls of patriots and cultural nationalists who maintained their indigenous values and dignity. Although they eventually rebelled, the pain and anger unleashed by cultural subjugation continue to this day.
Results of the State of Southeast Asia: 2019 online survey, which seeks views of Southeast Asians on regional affairs.
For example, the legacy of US colonialism and neocolonialism is very much alive in the Philippines. It is manifest in the constitutional recognition of English as an official language, and in the US-oriented educational system. It is felt daily by Filipinos in close contact with the US military and it is sensed at the highest levels of government. The United States was consistently ambiguous when asked officially whether, as a treaty ally, it would defend the Philippines in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea.
Because of such ambiguity, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte concluded that “America would never die for us”. After one of Duterte’s anti-US outbursts, his then foreign minister Perfecto Yasay explained that “the United States held on to invisible chains that reined us in toward dependency and submission as little brown brothers not capable of true independence and freedom”. Obviously, the Philippines’ pain and anger will not be easily soothed.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent reassurance to the Philippines was probably too little too late. Indeed, the US is now reaping what it sowed. This unhappy legacy has shaped the Philippine government’s foreign policy decisions, particularly its shift away from the US to China.
China has an opportunity to avoid making these egregious mistakes. Its position in Southeast Asia is quite different from that of Western colonialists and neocolonialists in several significant respects. It is a permanent part of the region. There is a large Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian nations, because of their past colonial experience, are very sensitive to any real or imagined slights because of someone else’s sense of cultural superiority; China, which chafed under roughly contemporaneous Western domination, should be able to empathise with former colonies and learn from Western countries’ mistakes.
There are both positive and negative aspects of China’s position. It has more legitimacy to assert power and influence in its geopolitical neighbourhood. But China must be especially careful in Southeast Asia because all countries there host a significant ethnic Chinese population that in many cases has sensitive relations with the non-Chinese majority.
There are already signs of incipient blowback from China’s increased presence in the region. For example, in the Philippines, the Chinese are investing heavily in real estate and gambling. According to one leading Singaporean commentator, “you feel China’s presence viscerally in the development of massive and gaudy casinos, malls and hotels”. Some Filipinos benefit from and welcome the developments. But others have been marginalised and oppose them.
China has also become vulnerable to charges of “debt-trap diplomacy”, interference in foreign political affairs and links to corruption at high levels of foreign governments. Debt-trap diplomacy is intentionally making asset-backed loans to a recipient country, thinking it may not be able to pay off the loans and is likely to forfeit the assets.
One of the most cited examples is a US$307 million loan from China’s Exim Bank to the Sri Lankan government for a major strategic port, which was built by a state-owned Chinese firm for US$361 million. Due to Sri Lanka’s inability to service the debt, the port was leased to a Chinese state-owned company for 99 years. The US, Japan, and India were concerned the port might be used as a Chinese naval base and made considerable political hay over it.
But this is not a lone example. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has called into question infrastructure projects with Chinese companies worth billions, explaining that Malaysia “just cannot pay” for them.
More generally, the “ugly Chinese tourist” is replacing the infamous “ugly American”, as Chinese tourism rises in Asia. Former vice-premier Wang Yang said the “uncivilised behaviour” of Chinese travellers had hurt the nation’s image.
These are but a few signs of a potentially problematic pattern. Add these instances of alleged bad behaviour, collective or individual, to China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea and it is easy to see why China and Chinese overseas have become vulnerable to criticism by some host countries, and competitors like the US. The damage so far is not severe. But China needs to be careful to keep it that way as it seeks to maintain and even expand its soft power and political influence in Asia.
Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China
