A Filipino soldier patrols on a beach on Thitu Island, which the Philippines calls Pag-asa, in the Spratly group of islands in the South China Sea, west of Palawan, Philippines, in May 2015. Photo: Reuters
Opinion
Opinion
by Lucio Blanco Pitlo III
Opinion
by Lucio Blanco Pitlo III
In the South China Sea, Chinese fishing vessels around Thitu Island might net more than they bargained for
More than 200 Chinese vessels surrounding a Philippine-occupied island may prompt a backlash against genuine fishing boats
Their presence may also push the Philippines, which has been edging closer to China, back into a tighter alliance with the US
The presence of more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels near Thitu Island, the biggest feature claimed by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, is stirring disquiet ahead of crucial Philippine midterm elections next month. In a rare break from his friendlier attitude towards China, President Rodrigo Duterte advised Beijing to “lay off” Pag-asa, the Philippine name for Thitu. The island is the seat of the country’s smallest town and home to over 200 people.
Fishing in the South China Sea is at its most active from March to June, with March and April the peak season in the Spratlys, which Manila calls Kalayaan. While fish may have drawn the swarm of Chinese boats, their presence at a time of improving ties has drawn ire in the Philippines.
With better access to supplies and refuge through a network of fortified outposts, the Chinese boats’ presence may become a fixture in the strategic and resource-rich sea.
The sheer number of Chinese vessels has raised concerns over unsustainable fishing. The Philippines’ failure to stop Chinese fishing within the 12-nautical mile territorial sea of Pag-asa and other Philippine-held islands may also invite further forays. Worse, it may be taken as acquiescence to Chinese fishing rights.
If Filipino fishing boats are unable to sail near Chinese-controlled reefs to fish, why should Chinese fishers be allowed so close to Philippine-administered features? This is especially so in the absence of a fishing or marine resource conservation arrangement among claimants in the sea.
Reports that the vessels are part of China’s “maritime militia” also heighten security worries. While China is not the only claimant to deploy such militia, its fleet is among the most equipped and its crews receive paramilitary training.
With the Chinese government providing fuel subsidies and communication equipment, they can go farther into the sea, closer to the shores of other claimants.
However, for all their contribution to bolstering China’s civilian jurisdiction in the contested sea, the maritime militia also pose problems. It could provoke a backlash against legitimate Chinese fishing boats. It may also forge closer Philippine-US maritime security cooperation. .
In December, Philippine Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana demanded a review of the country’s Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States. The treaty is under siege for its failure to deter China’s building of artificial islands and deployment of military weapons on the features it occupies. Some also see the treaty as outdated and unable to meet new challenges, including tactics by state-backed maritime militias.
To reassure the Philippines, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Manila in March. Lorenzana also flew to Washington in early April with the review of the treaty high on the agenda. However, Philippine officials are torn over whether greater clarity or continued ambiguity, which allows for flexibility, is preferable.
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (left) greets US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at Villamor Air Base, southeast of Manila, the Philippines, on February 28. Photo: AP
The uncertainty over the treaty review may have prompted China to keep a watchful eye. The presence of the Chinese fishing vessels suggests they are monitoring the situation.
While the Philippines has denied that the recently concluded Balikatan exercises with the US targeted a third country, Palawan, Mindoro and Zambales, Philippine provinces facing the South China Sea, were among the selected locations. Exercises included simulated retaking of an island airfield and an amphibious beach assault.
The massive presence of Chinese vessels around Pag-asa Island complicates warming Philippines-China ties. It remains to be seen how the fourth bilateral consultation mechanism meeting in Manila in early April has addressed the current concerns.
A possible sideline meeting during the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing could also provide an opportunity for President Duterte and Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss the matter.
In the run-up to the second belt and road gathering, Manila hosted the Boao Forum for Asia. This shows the increasingly difficult balancing act that the Philippines must perform, between expanded economic interaction with China and maintaining security and maritime resource bottom lines in the South China Sea.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation, a lecturer on Chinese Studies at Ateneo de Manila University and contributing editor (reviews) for the Asian Politics and Policy Journal. He also sits on the Board of the Philippine Association for China Studies
