The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, which has just concluded in Beijing, marked a milestone in the development of the initiative since it was launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013. With China’s sprawling infrastructure plan entering a new phase, the forum provided an opportunity to better define and multilateralise it. At a time when protectionism is on the rise, the “Belt and Road Initiative” has been a vector of globalisation, growth and investment in many regions for more than five years. Belt and road projects have created nearly 300,000 jobs . The World Bank estimates that host countries have reduced shipping times by up to 3.2 per cent, and trade costs by up to 2.8 per cent. In addition, the initiative has helped build up so-called “soft” infrastructure such as education, health care and other services. But two factors are contributing to a more challenging environment ahead for the initiative. First, the trade strategy has evolved beyond expectations. It has become truly global, with 126 countries having signed cooperation agreements. As the initiative links diverse geographies, it also needs to engage with a more complex group of stakeholders, who have their own interests and development plans. Second, a shift in the geopolitical climate and the rise of zero-sum thinking have cast a shadow of suspicion over the belt and road plan. Ironically, the very problems that call for a global vision – economic uncertainty, protectionism and mistrust – have created headwinds for the very initiative that could be part of the solution. At the international and local levels, some have politicised and misrepresented the initiative to serve their own interests. Such an atmosphere has contributed to a misunderstanding of the strategy. To press on with belt and road plan, China has to think small Given the geopolitical environment, concrete steps must be taken to ensure the belt and road plan’s long-term success and sustainability. These include multilateralising the initiative and defining its scope more clearly. Firstly, an international cooperation committee could be created to help the belt and road plan transition from a bilateral to a more multilateral approach. This committee would comprise a selection of representatives from key international organisations. Embedding a broad spectrum of experiences and perspectives into the advisory apparatus of the initiative would enhance its multilateral nature and help address concerns over its Sinocentric approach. Secondly, the initiative needs deeper engagement with international organisations, 29 of which have come on board. Working closely with established institutions such as the World Bank brings in additional expertise and resources, and helps ensure belt and road projects meet the highest international standards. The initiative could also join the Paris Club , an informal grouping of creditor nations that meet regularly to find solutions to debtor nations’ problems. This would help address claims that China is burdening belt and road countries with debt traps . Thirdly, building on the success of the first two events in Beijing, the Belt and Road Forum could become a rotating event hosted in global cities such as Geneva, Paris and Singapore. This would encourage diverse input from stakeholders around the world, and send a strong message that the belt and road plan is an open initiative for the benefit of all. China’s flexible belt and road approach leads to ambiguity Other mechanisms for multilateralising the plan could be extended. For example, an overseas belt and road arbitration centre could be set up, as a counterpart to the belt and road courts in Shenzhen and Xian. It could even be an arbitration agency in Geneva. This would build transparency and trust in the trade plan’s institutional framework. Since its inception, the Belt and Road Initiative has been a vision of economic cooperation. Contrary to the claims of some observers, it was never a top-down master plan. Rather, the task of translating the vision into viable, worthy projects was often decentralised to experts, policymakers and businesses in China and host countries. This is a common practice in China, where the central leadership issues broad guidelines, which lower-level officials and entities have latitude in adapting and implementing to fit local conditions across a continental-scale economy. Indeed, in the early years of the Belt and Road Initiative, this flexible approach was right for mobilising significant resources and giving the plan room to grow as more countries showed an interest in joining. However, as the trade strategy matures, the absence of a clearly defined plan has left it open to misunderstanding. Essentially, if it does not define itself better, it risks being defined (and often misconstrued) by others. Belt and Road may be the nearest help for the world’s ailing economy Although the initiative was launched by China, the willing participation of many countries has turned it into a global project. In effect, it has become a plan for global development – the kind the world has been sorely lacking since the financial crisis of 2008. To reflect this inclusiveness, the initiative could be more aptly reframed as the “Belt and Road International Development Plan”. The infrastructure and trade plan should be spelt out more clearly, including which countries have signed up for it and which countries are along its trade routes. The redefinition of the plan should emphasise its development-oriented nature to dispel geopolitical misunderstanding. To increase transparency around the plan, additional platforms could be set up. For example, there could be an open online system for project bidding worldwide. A clearer idea of what constitutes a belt and road project should also be implemented. The Belt and Road Initiative has shown great potential for shaping a better future for countries and communities around the world. Its role as a global development project and multilateral effort must be better defined, so it can fulfil its promise of benefit to humankind. Wang Huiyao is the founder of the Centre for China and Globalisation, a Beijing-based non-governmental think tank