During both the 2019 and 2014-15 “
yellow ribbon” movements, many may have overlooked some facts about Beijing’s approach towards Hong Kong.
Even as the 2019 extradition bill was being considered by the Legislative Council’s security panel, the government, presumably in keeping with Beijing’s intentions,
proposed changes to the bill that would set a very high hurdle for extradition.
For instance, the offence had to be a crime punishable by at least seven years’ imprisonment instead of the three years proposed initially; various white-collar and computer-related crimes were excluded, leaving mainly crimes like murder and rape; a provision was made that the request for extradition must come from a central authority, such as the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, not local authorities; and the government would look into whether the convicted offender could choose to serve the sentence in Hong Kong.
These would be on top of safeguards under existing extradition agreements, such as an open court hearing and the right to appeal, judicial review and legal aid.
According to Legco’s normal practice, more critical changes were likely to have been made in the relevant Bills Committee. What might those changes have been?
In a
press conference on June 15, Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor expressed willingness to take on board ideas from the bill’s critics, the
most authoritative of which has been the Bar Association. Any such progression was ruled out, however, by the
disruptive actions of pan-democrat councillors in Legco and by
mass protests for the bill to be withdrawn.
Nowadays, many do not remember that, in 2007,
a decision by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress provided for election of the chief executive by universal suffrage in 2017.
In 2014, another NPC standing committee decision stipulated that a nominating committee would select candidates for chief executive. But Chinese officials like Li Fei said publicly that
blank votes, which would give
de facto veto power to voters in the subsequent voting by one-person-one-vote, could be further discussed.
Such a system – or perhaps even one where nomination of candidates is also by one-person-one-vote as the pan-democrats demanded – would likely result in a chief executive who is neither “yellow” nor “blue”, but somewhere in between.
Yet, the pan-democrats insisted on their demand for
civic nomination and Occupy Central continued. Polarised, confrontational politics – as manifested recently – persists.
So, with the pan-democrats ostensibly bent on single-minded opposition, the two “yellow ribbon” movements have served to express negative sentiment towards Beijing and about certain intractable
socioeconomic problems, but with opportunity costs to the justice system and development of democracy for Hong Kong.
James J. Lee, Kowloon Tong
