A Hong Kong academic is casting a new, localist light on Hong Kong’s months-long protests, triggered by a controversial rendition law. Brian Fong Chi-hang of the Hong Kong University of Education argued, in a recent article published in The Diplomat , that the Hong Kong protesters represent “a stateless nation struggling for autonomy”. Drawing strength from Western theories on nationalism, Fong argued that although Hong Kong is not a sovereign state, it fits the definition of a nation by virtue of being a “political community” built on common civic values pursuing the “right to self-government”. While Fong’s hypothesis is interesting as an academic theory, its account of the emergence of Hong Kong’s autonomy movement is not based on Hong Kong’s true history. Its vision of Hong Kong as a “young stateless nation” based on common values, with its chance of success hingeing on China’s implosion and superpower intervention, is doomed to fail. As someone who witnessed Hong Kong’s rise to prosperity, and was closely involved in the Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong, as well as preparations for Hong Kong’s transition into a special administrative region of China, I can speak from first-hand experience that there was little ambition for “self-government” on the part of the colonial government or the people of Hong Kong in the colonial era. Two distinguished scholars, Ambrose King Yeo-chi of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Steve Tsang of SOAS’ China Institute, documented in their studies how the British and Hong Kong governments rejected democratic self-rule as an option for Hong Kong people on two occasions – the first time in the late 1940s, after the British regained power after the Japanese occupation; the second time in the late 1960s, after the Hong Kong government did an in-depth review of the social, economic and political factors leading to the 1966 and 1967 riots. In the colonial era, policymaking in Hong Kong was monopolised by British officials in Hong Kong, often in close consultation with London. Little was done to prepare local officials for leadership post-1997, let alone for “autonomy” as a “young stateless nation”, free of the supervision of its sovereign power. One could blame Britain’s unwillingness to grant Hong Kong people democratic self-rule on China’s hard line on the city’s status. In 1972, soon after China joined the United Nations, it made crystal clear at that forum its rejection of Hong Kong’s status as a colony and any attendant right to self-determination. Where the people are concerned, it is simply not true that there was a groundswell of yearning for autonomy, or separation from China. Despite their fears of communism, many Hong Kong inhabitants of mainland origins maintained organic ties with their kinsfolk in the mainland. During China’s years of “great famine” in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Hong Kong’s main border control point for entry into China at Lo Wu was regularly thronged with Hong Kong residents hauling bags full of food, medical supplies and clothing for their relations on the mainland. Hong Kong people have superiority complex about mainland At local universities, some of the earliest social movements were driven by a passion to support the fledgling Chinese nation. The drive to promote the Chinese language as an official language in the 1970s, and the “Protect the Diaoyu Islands” movement, organised by nationalistic student leaders, were all manifestations of pride in the nation and support for territorial integrity. During the Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong in the 1980s, the Hong Kong people’s main concern was to preserve the capitalist systems, the rule of law underpinning their freedoms and their existing way of life. Business confidence crashed in October 1983, when the negotiations appeared to be getting nowhere. Yet confidence rebounded in September 1984 when China and Britain reached an agreement on the territory’s future. The Sino-British Joint Declaration , which nailed down detailed arrangements for maintaining Hong Kong’s separate systems after 1997, was warmly cheered. On the basis of the Joint Declaration, Beijing proceeded to draft the Basic Law governing the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in close consultation with advisers from the territory. The certainty provided by the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, along with optimism about the future, laid the foundation for the “golden age” of Hong Kong’s rapid economic ascent in the 1990s. One-two blow of protests and trade spat won’t kill Hong Kong It should be noted that the “Elaboration” of China’s basic policies regarding Hong Kong, in Annex I of the Joint Declaration, makes it quite clear that Hong Kong would be established as a special administrative region “directly under the authority of the Central People’s Government” enjoying a “high degree of autonomy”, which, by definition, is a qualified form of autonomy. The people of Hong Kong were left in no doubt about its future status, with jitters subsiding on Beijing’s guarantee of maintenance of Hong Kong’s separate system and lifestyle. Fong’s tale of Hong Kong’s struggle for autonomy, dating back to the introduction of border controls in 1949, is pure fabrication and fantasy. His hypothesis that Hong Kong could win a rearguard battle to gain greater autonomy through the “water revolution” and “internationalisation” of autonomy – in other words, through intervention or sanctions by the United States and its allies – goes against the wishes of large numbers of Hongkongers who want the city to return to its civil, orderly and prosperous ways of not that long ago. Glory be to those who helped build our city, and those who return it to peace; not to those who put Hong Kong on a primrose path of self-destruction. Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee is a lawmaker and chairwoman of the New People’s Party