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A Donald Trump impersonator among the hundreds gathered at Chater Garden on December 1 to celebrate the enactment of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. Photo: Winson Wong
Opinion
Opinion
by Brian P. Klein
Opinion
by Brian P. Klein

Truth is, the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act changes nothing for protesters and their hopes

  • US sanctions have a poor record of spurring democratic change and the threat of removing Hong Kong’s special status is unlikely to be carried out until the city is beyond rescue anyway. The act changes nothing, certainly not Hong Kong’s political tide
Celebrations began almost immediately as word spread that United States President Donald Trump had signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. In a rare display of bipartisanship, US Congress voted for the legislation with near unanimous support. Hundreds gathered in Hong Kong’s Chater Garden, waving American flags to thank the US government for its support.

Now that Trump has signed the legislation, protesters might wonder what comes next? Unfortunately, the answer is nothing. At least, nothing significant that might turn the political tide in Hong Kong.

The act, which requires an annual human rights review, allows potential sanctions on government officials, and prohibits sales of crowd control equipment. Those provisions will not limit Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor from quelling protests.

This type of sanctions legislation has a long history of failing to promote democratic political change. Decades of US sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela have done little to change reality on the ground in these countries. Their leadership continues to survive while repression remains the norm.
In Venezuela’s case, President Nicolas Maduro remains in power despite a near-complete economic collapse including food, medicine and power shortages, and being cut off from the international financial system, forcing the country to barter. Despite every attempt to influence events and even Trump’s open support of Maduro’s main political opposition, Juan Guaidó, nothing has changed.
Consider, too, the extensive US sanctioning regime in place on individuals and corporate entities in Russia. While many companies and oligarchs have been effectively cut off from the US, domestic political reform has stalled. Moscow has managed to run massive disinformation campaigns targeting the US, again without major consequences.
US moral authority has also weakened considerably as regimes with significant human rights abuses such as Saudi Arabia continue to flout international norms. Last year, US officials cancelled participation in a Saudi-led investment conference soon after the state-sanctioned murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, but this year, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner attended the event.
Without multilateral sanctions by other large economies such as the European Union, Washington’s ability to effectively promote democracy abroad remains weak. Trump’s insistence on scaling back US involvement overseas further hinders effective human rights policy.

How big a deal is the Hong Kong Democracy Act for businesses?

While passage of the act is a victory of sorts, this type of legislation is most effective as a warning to foreign political leaders with strong US ties. Under the new law, the sanctioning of individuals deemed responsible for “undermining fundamental freedoms and autonomy in Hong Kong” may result in the seizure of their property in the US and denial of entry. But Lam seems far more concerned about what Beijing thinks, than about going on an American road trip or buying a New York condominium.

The portion of the new law with the most teeth is the potential reclassification of Hong Kong’s special economic status vis-à-vis the US. That may look like a significant point of leverage, but to put it bluntly, a major revision in US-Hong Kong economic relations is unlikely to happen any time soon, if ever.

Conditions in Hong Kong would have to deteriorate to such a degree that international businesses would already be fleeing, making the loss of preferential trading status less significant. Were President Xi Jinping to launch a major crackdown – suspending the legal system, shutting down the free press, or further restricting individual liberties – the US Congress might act, but it would likely to be too late to influence events.

As the lengthy US-China trade war has shown, Beijing is prepared to take economic hits, especially when they target structural issues, such as state-owned enterprise reform. Territorial and political control over Hong Kong certainly fits into that category.
The more significant signal, seen clearly across the Pacific and around the world, was the landslide victory of Hong Kong pro-democracy candidates in recent district council elections. Citizens exercising their franchise, en masse, sent a powerful message, one far more convincing and likely to garner more international support than the waving of American flags outside the US consulate.
Those particular expressions may actually do more harm than good. Beijing has long warned of the “black hand” of foreign interference, and the demonstrators celebrating passage of the US law only feeds that claim. It also diminishes what the demonstrations have achieved on their own.

Protesters will be sadly disappointed by a lengthy bureaucratic process in Washington that will do little to shield Hong Kong from China’s blunt force trauma. The sooner they realise that the act's passage will not fundamentally change US-Hong Kong relations, the sooner they can chart their own historical course.

Brian P. Klein, a former US diplomat, is the founder and CEO of Decision Analytics, a strategic advisory and political risk firm based in New York City

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