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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Opinion
by Emanuele Scimia
Opinion
by Emanuele Scimia

The killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani is a reality check for China’s Middle East aspirations

  • Hopes that China’s presence in the volatile region could provide some needed stability now appear too optimistic in light of the US’ targeted strike
  • A full-blown US-Iran confrontation would be bad news for Beijing, undermining its push for belt and road development
The killing on Friday of top Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani by the United States was very bad news for China. Tehran’s inevitable response will further deteriorate the geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf region, which serves much of Chinese oil needs and is an essential element of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Beijing said the US drone strike against the Iranian general, who headed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s elite Quds Force and was responsible for Iran’s overseas military and intelligence operations, was a form of abuse.

In a phone call with his Iranian counterpart over the weekend, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that China would continue to play a “constructive role” in preserving peace and security in the Middle East.

Despite Wang’s words of commitment, Soleimani’s elimination largely contradicts the thesis of those who claim China’s presence and activism in the region could work as a deterrent to Washington’s military adventurism.

Beijing cannot deter the US in the region, and probably cannot mitigate Iran’s ambitions
At the end of the recent joint naval exercises between Iran, China and Russia in Gulf waters, Iranian President Hassan Rowhani said the drills had infuriated the US and its allies in the region.
The Chinese had emphasised that the manoeuvres had “no connection with the regional situation”, but some observers argued that they would send a clear message to Washington and de-escalate the regional tension. They did not.

The surgical operation against Soleimani came after months of escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran.

The US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and the reimposition of sanctions against the Iranians was followed by attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, the downing of an American surveillance drone over the Strait of Hormuz and the shelling of strategic Saudi oil facilities – which the US government blamed on Iran.

The Iranian regime could now retaliate against US forces and interests in the Middle East, launch new attacks on Western merchant vessels or even try to close the Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the world’s oil supplies passes daily.

Particularly, disruption of shipping through the vital chokepoint would be disastrous for China, given that roughly 44 per cent of its oil imports comes from Persian Gulf nations.

But the Chinese would also look with concern at possible Iranian covert operations (either directly or by proxies) against US assets in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or against Israel, as they would all have a dramatic destabilising effect in the area, negatively affecting the expansion of the belt and road scheme, which is aimed at turning China into the driving force of global trade.

Furthermore, a full-blown confrontation between Iran and the US would imperil multiple efforts by the international community to put an end to conflicts that have turned devastated countries into hotbeds and safe havens for Islamic terrorist organisations, including for Uygur militants from China’s northwestern province of Xinjiang, who are active both in Syria and Afghanistan.

Iranians attend a funeral procession for Qassem Soleimani, head of the elite Quds Force, in Tehran on Monday. Photo: West Asia News Agency via Reuters

The death of Soleimani is a reality check for China’s Middle East aspirations. Beijing cannot deter the US in the region, and probably cannot mitigate Iran’s ambitions.

So far, Chinese special envoys to the greater Middle East have not yielded any substantial result, be it the civil war in Syria, the conflict in Yemen, the Saudi-Iranian cold war, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute or Afghanistan’s civil strife.

This has made it impossible for China to focus on its primary objective in the vast area – laying the groundwork for investment in the reconstruction of these war-torn nations.

Chinese diplomacy worked well in finalising the Iran nuclear agreement, but at the time it was supported by the European Union, and had to deal with a US administration that was truly seeking an accord with the Iranians.

US’ ‘swashbuckling’ to blame for chaos in Middle East, China says

Perhaps Chinese diplomats are still not used to the niceties of Middle Eastern politics. The major problem for China is that it must navigate a mixed bag of relations with countries that are constantly at odds with one another.

Many believe Beijing has successfully built a strategic axis with Iran in recent years, but its main supplier of oil in the region is Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s regional arch-rival, followed by Iraq and Oman. The Islamic Republic is only China’s fourth-largest crude provider, according to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Observatory of Economic Complexity.
A Saudi Aramco jet flies over a desert highway en route to the company’s oilfield in Khurais, Saudi Arabia, last September. China’s main supplier of oil in the Middle East is Saudi Arabia. Iran is only the country’s fourth-largest provider. Photo: Bloomberg
Then there is the fact that the Chinese are investing much more in the Gulf states than in Iran. Since the launch of the belt and road plan in 2013, China’s investment in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar) has reached US$56.3 billion. During the same period, Chinese companies channelled US$13.7 billion into Iran, the China Global Investment Tracker reports.

Arms sales are no different. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China sold US$27 million worth of weapons to Iran between 2013 and 2018, while Saudi Arabia purchased Chinese weaponry worth US$125 million. It has also been reported that Riyadh has accelerated its ballistic missile programme with the help of Beijing.

More importantly, there is no appetite in China for a direct involvement in the many conflicts ravaging the Middle East. The fact that the US may shift its focus from the South China Sea and trade war to Iran could be a consolation prize for Beijing, but the potential downside would probably be far more significant.

Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst

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