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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Opinion
by Mark J. Valencia
Opinion
by Mark J. Valencia

To prevail over the US in the South China Sea, Beijing must be less ambiguous and more diplomatic

  • Many of China’s claims to the South China Sea are defensible, but its spokespersons have been too vague in stating and defending them
  • Beijing must learn to win by persuasion, and refine its claims so they are compatible with the international order

In 1954, when Zhou Enlai was both premier and foreign minister of the new China, he famously put his spin on Clausewitz’s dictum on war and said: “All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means.”

Given that China is engaged in a long-term struggle with others for control of the South China Sea, it needs to greatly improve its relevant public diplomacy in both tenor and tone. Although many of China’s criticised positions are actually defensible, its public relations spokespersons are vague in stating its claims and defending them. This needs to be corrected.

Recently, Indonesia objected to a “violation of sovereignty” by a Chinese coastguard vessel in Indonesia’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. Indonesia’s foreign ministry specified its complaints and referred only obliquely to the Philippines’ South China Sea arbitration case that went against China.

But China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang’s response was over the top. He declared: “The so-called award of the South China Sea arbitration is illegal, null and void and we have long made it clear that China neither accepts nor recognises it. The Chinese side firmly opposes any country, organisation or individual using the invalid arbitration award to hurt China's interests.”

This overreaction was counterproductive, angering Indonesia, the de facto leader of Asean (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and a middle military power in its own right. It wounded Indonesians’ national pride, putting pressure on the government to take action.

Moreover, it drew unnecessary attention to China’s controversial refusal to accept the verdict of a tribunal set up under a treaty to which it is a party. This just played right into the American narrative that China is defying the existing international order and bent on bullying the region into submission.

China’s Foreign Ministry could have played it cooler. It could have specified that its coastguard vessel was exercising freedom of navigation. It could have argued that the presence of its fishing vessels in Indonesia’s claimed exclusive economic zone is another matter to be negotiated.

This is certainly not the first instance of poor Chinese diplomacy with regard to the South China Sea. Indeed, it is becoming a pattern. When Hanoi objected to Chinese oil exploration in an area of Vietnam’s continental shelf, Beijing could have specified why it claims the area in question.

Beijing’s South China Sea stance is driving Vietnam into America’s arms

When Malaysia filed a submission to establish the limits of its continental shelf, China could have specified how Kuala Lumpur’s claim overlaps with Beijing’s claims around the Paracel Islands, instead of protesting that Malaysia had “seriously infringed China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction”.

While China’s South China Sea policy has been somewhat successful in advancing its interests, many things could still go wrong. This is particularly true as China ratchets up pressure on rival claimants.

This region has seen this movie before. Southeast Asian states are very sensitive to any whiff of an attitude like that of their past colonial masters. China must be especially careful because many Southeast Asian countries host a significant Chinese population that often has sensitive relations with the ethnic majority. China must learn from the former colonial powers’ mistakes.

Otherwise, some Southeast Asian states could unite against a neo-imperialist China. The detente between China and the Philippines could unravel, with the Philippines back in the United States’ camp. This would be a serious blow to Beijing’s bid for soft power in the region, and a fillip for Washington.

What could China do? First and foremost it could be less ambiguous on its claims to the South China Sea, while pointing out flaws in its critics’ arguments. Ambiguity has served China’s purpose, up to a point. But now, such obfuscation only encourages the other claimants.

The perils of Chinese ambiguity

When it protested to United Nations secretary general Antonio Guterres about Malaysia’s claim, China mentioned its rights to “internal waters, territorial sea and a contiguous zone based on its Nanhai Zhudao” (the South China Sea islands), its claim to “an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf” and its “historic rights in the South China Sea”.

The other claims are fine; the last is questionable unless China is referring specifically to its traditional fishing rights in the territorial sea surrounding Scarborough Shoal and possibly other disputed features. China should say so, and refine its claims in a manner compatible with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

For example, China might argue that technically, the tribunal’s ruling on the legal status of the Spratlys applies only to the features it named, and not to the Paracels – at least not directly.

It could then argue that the Paracels belong to China, that they are legal islands, and that they generate a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf extending 350 nautical miles. This would cover some of the areas claimed by Vietnam and Malaysia, and necessitate the establishment of boundaries.

Until necessary boundaries are established, these are disputed areas. According to the precedent set by the arbitration regarding the oil border dispute between Guyana and Suriname, no country should unilaterally proceed with developing a disputed area. China could reiterate that it has been consistently willing to negotiate these issues.

It could point to its sincerity in negotiating and abiding by agreements in similar situations – with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, Japan in the East China Sea, and with South Korea in the Yellow Sea. China could also stress that it has offered to jointly develop petroleum resources with the Philippines and is willing to explore similar arrangements with others.

China could acknowledge that it has damaged the regional environment with its island building and destructive fishing methods. But it could point out that so have the other claimants. It could also emphasise that it is undertaking environmental remedial action there and challenge the others to join in.

In sum, China needs to tread more carefully with the region.

Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China

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