When faced with a common threat, China and the United States have always united, during WWII, the cold war and the nuclear crises on the Korean peninsula. However. in recent years, they have been in strategic competition. Thanks to the novel coronavirus, they are engaged in a conflict on a new front.
The first shot was fired by
The Wall Street Journal, who
published a commentary titled “China is the Real Sick Man of Asia”, about the Chinese response to the outbreak. Beijing retaliated by
expelling three reporters of the newspaper. Then the US government escalated tensions by
limiting the personnel size of US bureaus of official Chinese media outlets.
Besides this, there was a quarrel over the US offer to spend up to
US$100 million in coronavirus help to China and other affected countries, which the Chinese side did not seem grateful for, instead criticising the US for
suspending flights to and from China at its darkest hour.
Then there was the spat over the origin of Sars-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19. Many in the US believe it came from China, while some Chinese suspect the US. The controversy quickly escalated into a war of words. After US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo repeatedly referred to the novel coronavirus as the “
Wuhan virus”, a senior Chinese diplomat cast doubt on the transparency of information disclosures from the US government. US President Donald Trump joined the spat, provocatively using “
Chinese virus” in his speech and tweets.
Why are bilateral relations deteriorating at the height of a public health crisis when cooperation is urgently needed? It was mainly due to the two leaderships’ different perceptions of the severity of the coronavirus outbreak. Both are on the same boat but with one on deck and the other in the cabin, they perceived the coming storm differently.
If the outbreak had happened at the same time in the two countries, it is likely that neither will blame the other. At the height of the outbreak in China, there were few confirmed cases in the US, so the Trump administration was relaxed and saw no need to actively respond. After China defused its crisis and it was America’s turn to suffer, the US started to complain about China covering up information and worsening the situation, and that angered China.
For all the US-China spats, there is a silver lining. President Xi Jinping and President Trump have spoken twice on the phone in the past two months to try and stabilise bilateral relations. In the February call, Trump offered China help against the outbreak; earlier this month, Xi
offered China’s support to the US. The time is ripe for cooperation.
After China’s strong Covid-19 measures yielded good outcomes and the rate of infections and deaths decreased, other countries including the US started to take restrictive measures too, though milder than China’s. These include travel bans, quarantines and
shelter-in-place orders.
Scientists in both countries are also
working on a vaccine. With their experience in treating Covid-19 patients, some Chinese doctors are sharing best practices with their US counterparts.
However, cooperation remains sporadic and the future of US-China relations is as murky as the trajectory of the pandemic. Three virus-related factors may shape bilateral relations in the coming years.
In both countries, opinions are divided over the value of sustaining close relations. Some people draw lessons from the sudden disruption of supply chains and underline the necessity of
economic decoupling, while others see opportunities to cooperate on non-conventional security issues besides
nuclear non-proliferation and
climate change.
Therefore, stable and constructive US-China relations depends, to a large extent, on the result of the contest between their respective domestic forces – globalists vs nationalists in the US, and reformists (generally pro-American) vs leftists (generally anti-American) in China.
The second factor is how the world scores the two on their efforts to fight Covid-19. Having defused the crisis at home, China is able to help other countries by sending medical equipment and personnel, gestures that can
expand its influence overseas, at least in public health. The US, already wary of China’s growing influence, will not be comfortable with this.
The outbreak may have
stalled progress on China’s Belt and Road Initiative but not for long, and the heated contest between the two giants over soft power will continue in the wake of the pandemic.
The future of US-China relations also hinges on their economic resilience. With its mass lockdowns, China controlled the outbreak but paid a
huge economic price. China has achieved
zero growth in local infections but it is still hard to return to normal, as the virus may be merely dormant, ready to return next winter or next year.
The economic future will be grim, at least for the next few months, even if there are no further outbreaks. The US is no better than China, having also adopted restrictive measures to tackle the virus. It risks
recession and huge debts after rounds of
quantitative easing.
The speed of each country’s economic recovery will affect the outcome of the US-China power game in the long run. If the US economy emerges more resilient and robust and the economic gap widens, China will have to take a softer line in the international arena. If the economic gap narrows, competition will intensify between an increasingly anxious US and a more confident China.
Most likely, however, both of these highly interconnected economies would be weakened, leading to a marathon for primacy with no visible finish line.
Cui Lei is an associate research fellow with China Institute of International Studies
