Indecisiveness about a two-decade-old military pact is highlighting the tightrope the Philippines has to walk as the US and China, its two most important security and trade partners, lock horns.
Under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines might go down in history as the only country to curse a sitting US president and drop an F-bomb on China and yet still engage both. However, the strain of dealing with the two great powers jostling for geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia is becoming apparent.
On May 21, Manila hosted the sixth round of the Philippines-China bilateral consultation mechanism meeting, which for the first time produced neither a joint statement nor a joint press release. Instead, both sides issued separate press releases, suggesting undercurrents of discord. It was also the first time the meeting was held virtually.
Manila has stridently protested about the continued presence of Chinese ships in its exclusive economic zone, while Beijing has professed dismay over what it sees as overhyping of the issue. Both sides have agreed to discuss compensation for Filipino fishermen whose ship was sunk in a collision with a Chinese vessel at Recto Bank in 2019.
On the other side of the equation, Manila and Washington have yet to agree on whether to continue the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) after months of negotiations. Signed in 1998, it provides legal cover for American troops to visit the country to train with their Filipino counterparts. Duterte abrogated the accord last February but has twice deferred termination.
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Philippines sounds alarm over 200 Chinese ships in the South China Sea
Philippines sounds alarm over 200 Chinese ships in the South China Sea
But with the August deadline fast closing in, there is still no light at the end of the tunnel for the pact. The US could reportedly withdraw its troops by June or July if the agreement is not renewed. And Washington may not be so enthusiastic about a third deferment, given the difficulties of keeping alliance commitments on the basis of short, precarious six-month time frames.
Demonstrating a low point in bilateral relations, the US did not cite either the Philippines or the US-Philippines alliance in the interim National Security Guidance released by the Biden administration in March. It was the first time that has happened since 1996.
Another indication of turbulence in the alliance is the continued absence of a US ambassador to the Philippines since former top envoy Sung Kim left the job in October. It is one of the longest vacancies for the post since the early 1980s, when bilateral ties were beset by the continued de facto implementation of martial law under former strongman Ferdinand Marcos.
Kim won Duterte’s good graces for helping facilitate the return of the Balangiga church bells in 2018. The grant of an absolute pardon to former US Marine corporal Joseph Scott Pemberton, who was convicted of killing transgender woman Jennifer Laude in 2014, was seen as a farewell gift to the departing diplomat as he readies for his next posting in Jakarta. Kim is now assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.
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Philippine coastguard sends strong warning to Chinese vessels during South China Sea patrol
Philippine coastguard sends strong warning to Chinese vessels during South China Sea patrol
Duterte railed against the US for its alleged failure to broker a mutually satisfactory end to weeks of stand-off between Manila and Beijing over Scarborough Shoal in 2012. He likewise criticised Washington’s inaction in the wake of China’s massive artificial island building from 2014 to 2016 while an arbitration case was under way.
That said, he understands the deep military-to-military ties between the two allies and the need to have some insurance against any ominous Chinese designs in the West Philippine Sea. Thus, the 36th iteration of the annual Balikatan military exercises took place in April despite the same drills getting cancelled last year because of the pandemic.
But burgeoning economic ties with China and the desire to move away from overreliance on the US in pursuit of an “independent foreign policy” prompted Duterte to curb engagement with his country’s former coloniser.
Aware of the risks from hosting American troops and military assets, given escalating great power rivalry, he declined to take part in joint maritime patrols or exercises outside the country’s territorial sea or internal waters. Many exercises have been geared towards humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and counterterrorism. He cautioned the US not to bring nuclear weapons to the country or he would immediately terminate the VFA.
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Explained: the history of China’s territorial disputes
Explained: the history of China’s territorial disputes
Duterte knows he cannot sever the US alliance. However, he might try to extract as many concessions as he can – whether in the form of payment, which critics decry as extortion, or Covid-19 vaccines, military aid or unequivocal US security guarantees that cover the West Philippine Sea – in exchange for US access to Philippine locations.
Efforts to meet some of the more legitimate demands have been in the offing. Statements from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his predecessor Mike Pompeo suggest a firmer articulation of the nature and geographic bounds of the US security commitment to its ally.
The donation of US$18 million worth of precision-guided missiles and munitions during the visit of former National Security adviser Robert O’Brien to Manila last November also showed Washington stepping up to extend military aid. Whether Duterte thinks these concessions are commensurate with the risks the Philippines could face should conflict between the US and China break out over maritime flashpoints is the more pressing question.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation
