Why US-Russia reconciliation will be difficult despite warmer relations
- There is ample evidence that Moscow and the West continue to see each other as adversaries and that Russia views China as a valuable partner
- Russia’s growing closeness with China is not equivalent to Moscow becoming Beijing’s junior partner, though, as Russia still has its own goals and priorities
Rather than engaging in a hopeless exercise of trying to sow rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, the new US strategy is to stabilise relations with Russia so it can focus on countering China.
The success of Washington’s “Russia stabilisation” policy is not guaranteed, but it is possible. For one, Russia seems to have much less appetite for confrontation with the West than was the case in the 2010s.
The Biden-Putin summit can be viewed as an attempt to reach a non-aggression pact. It is too early to say if the effort would succeed, but there seems to be a desire in Washington to have such a pact with Russia.
Third, Washington seems to have shelved the idea of admitting Ukraine to Nato and is possibly considering leaving it as a buffer state, which should remove the most dangerous flashpoint between the US and Russia.
That said, some developments that happened in the wake of the Putin-Biden rendezvous in Switzerland have underscored that Moscow and the West continue to see each other as adversaries and reconciliation will not be easy.
Almost simultaneously with the summit, Russia’s Pacific Fleet held large-scale exercises off Hawaii. They were Russia’s first large naval drills on high seas in the Pacific since the Soviet era.
That sounds somewhat ambivalent and suggestive, especially taking into account that the same statement also pledges to enhance the military cooperation of Russia and China, including through “an increase in the number and scale of joint combat training missions”.
Significantly, the two sides dedicated almost two pages of their joint statement to cyberspace. Moscow has traditionally been closely aligned with Beijing on issues of internet and data governance, but this alignment might have now reached a new stage.
Russia’s growing strategic closeness with China is not equivalent to Moscow becoming Beijing’s junior partner. While agreeing with China on most major international issues, Russia has its own vision for Eurasia, which is not completely in sync with Beijing’s.
Even though the Kremlin acknowledges the reality of China’s growing economic preponderance, the integration on the supercontinent should be less centripetal, more multilateral and more Eurasian, with Russia wanting the role of key politico-diplomatic broker for itself.
Artyom Lukin is associate professor and deputy director for research at the Oriental Institute – School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University, in Vladivostok