Domestic politics is driving US and China to seek a ‘time out’ amid rising tensions

Agreements reached on a host of contentious issues, before and after the Xi-Biden summit, were made possible by the need for both leaders to focus on domestic challenges
Renewed engagement is especially timely between the two militaries, in light of US anxiety over Chinese advances in space and cyber technologies

Douglas H. Paal

Published: 1:30am, 9 Dec 2021

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In the days preceding and following the virtual summit between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in November, modest agreements were reached between lower-level officials to deal with practical issues. These were in contrast with the belligerent tone both sides took in March at the meeting of senior officials in Anchorage, Alaska.

What happened between March and November? American officials are quick to assert that Beijing had viewed the incoming Biden administration as a return to Obama-era policy, and needed to be disabused that Washington would be cajoled into dropping Trump-era policies. They view the change in tone and cooperation from Beijing as a result of their initial tough stance.

Normally, after recording minor advances between troubled powers, such outcomes have a thousand fathers, all proudly providing background information to favoured columnists with stories of their achievements. But not this time, when claiming progress might invite partisan allegations of softness on China.

Chinese officials take a different view, unsurprisingly, and believe their uncompromising positions and rhetoric in Anchorage and at subsequent meetings caused the US to climb down from its posture of demanding to deal with China from a “position of strength”.

They believe the US softened its rhetoric and restrained its behaviour because the alternative was not working. They internally take credit for standing up to America.

The truth of what happened probably lies somewhere in-between.

To summarise the changes, “working groups” in Beijing from the US Embassy and Chinese government agreed on formulas to ease restrictions on the issuance of visas to each other’s journalists.

They agreed to return to China Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, who was detained in Canada on US charges, and Zhang Yujing, a Chinese woman convicted of illegally entering Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate, while releasing Canadian prisoners or hostages, and permitting the departure of American citizens previously prohibited from leaving China.

After the virtual summit, US special envoy John Kerry and his Chinese counterpart Xie Zhenhua agreed to a modest but potentially productive programme of cooperation to manage carbon dioxide emissions, at the conclusion of the COP26 climate change conference in Glasgow.

Later, as oil prices soared globally, China agreed to join a multilateral group of nations, led by the US, to release petroleum stockpiles into the marketplace, a form of global financial cooperation. China also joined in a multilateral agreement on minimum taxes on digital trade.

While the two leaders explored in tough terms each other’s “red lines” over Taiwan, the South China Sea and other difficult issues, they also gave a nod to discussions on “strategic stability”.

There appear to be ambiguities or differences on what the leaders expect those conversations between the two militaries to include, and at what level of leadership, but some form of virtual meeting seems likely in the next two months.

These agreements were not the stuff of a major summit “joint statement,” or of boasting headlines in either capital. But, in the context of plainly hardening attitudes in the two governments towards each other, they seemed to represent a welcome turn away from escalating tensions.

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Why did this turnaround occur? I put it down to domestic politics in both countries.
First, Xi, strong though he already is, faces an important year and more ahead. China will be under a global spotlight as it hosts the Winter Olympics in February, with ripe prospects for protests and diplomatic snubs.

Later in the year, Xi will orchestrate the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party to further entrench his rule and reputation. On the way to that congress, he will need to ensure economic stability and growth, and not let international tensions threaten markets, access and jobs.

Second, Biden is struggling to enact his Build Back Better agenda. While there have been some successes, other big legislation remains to be put into force. He faces a high likelihood of losing his razor-thin majority in the House of Representatives next autumn, so needs to get as much done as he can before that moment arrives.

Like Xi, Biden does not need an unintended conflict driven by issues, such as the growing gap between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan, to disrupt his domestic agenda. By the same token, Biden does not want to make big claims of progress with China, for fear of inviting Republican criticism. So, we now see the making of a “time out” on the scratchiest issues between the two leading powers.

In that light, the revelations of growing Chinese construction of massive missile silo fields, testing of hypersonic partial orbital vehicles, and development of space and cyber activity make it urgent to resume long interrupted military-to-military dialogue. Even during the troubled Trump era, military communications remained effective, but not so far under Biden.

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Hopes should not be raised high for early results. China has long preferred secrecy to transparency, born of necessity when its systems were weaker than its potential adversaries’. The US seeks to understand China’s policy on “no first use”, in light of its now bigger force, as well as to probe Chinese understanding of the “indications and warning” that might trigger conflict.

Observers should watch these upcoming talks, however, as closely as possible as a measure of the stabilisation of the strategic competition that might survive the coming year or so of relative detente as both leaders focus on their domestic situations. US relations with China are precarious and growing increasingly dangerous and are in need of better military communication.

Douglas H. Paal is a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace