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Coronavirus Hong Kong
Opinion
David Dodwell

Outside In | Hong Kong’s Covid-19 woes show administrators alone cannot solve crises

  • The arrival of a team of policy experts from Beijing offers a sliver of hope of saving Hong Kong from leadership that is out of its depth
  • With any luck, the unnerving, morale-sapping period of flip-flops, procrastination, mixed messages and policy missteps will soon end

Reading Time:4 minutes
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Health workers from mainland China test samples from Hong Kong residents for the coronavirus at an inflatable mobile testing lab in Hong Kong on March 1. Hong Kong has ramped up its testing capacity with the help of the mobile laboratories, as the city grapples with tens of thousands of Covid-19 cases daily. Photo: AP
As Mike Enright, his wife Edith and I were putting the finishing touches on our book The Hong Kong Advantage in the spring of 1997, we were spending a lot of time analysing how Hong Kong would weather the transition from British to Chinese control.

While we were dismissive of reports of the “death of Hong Kong” – complete with images of mainland troops pouring over the border and mainland officials swiftly grabbing the levers of power despite promises of a “high level of autonomy” – we were clear there would be profound changes that would be unclear and difficult to anticipate. But there were several important changes that seemed clear but were either ignored or failed to attract the interest of those managing the transition.

One that particularly concerned us and is relevant to our Covid-19 crisis today was the reality that as Britain’s last governor and his team left on July 1, 1997, they took with them the entirety of Hong Kong’s strategic planning and policymaking expertise. Hong Kong had always boasted a first-class administration, but that is exactly what they were – an administration.
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Policymaking for Hong Kong was formulated around the colonial governor by a small team imported from London. Once policies were clear and received the green light from the Foreign Office, the task of implementing and administering them was entrusted with confidence to a highly competent administration.

If the governor lacked the necessary expertise, experts were flown in. When in 1987 Hong Kong’s stock market dramatically fell 33 per cent on what was called “Black Monday”, a high-level rescue team was flown in from London within days to deliver the policy expertise necessary to mount a rescue.

It seems few realised in 1997 that an administration without a strong policy-formulating team underpinning them was perilously vulnerable. Hong Kong was about to become a row boat without a rudder. It had many people able to heave dutifully on oars but none equipped to manage the direction of travel.

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