Two steps India and Pakistan can take after accidental missile launch

While the restraint of the Pakistani military following the incident is admirable, the two nuclear-armed neighbours can do more to strengthen confidence-building measures

Sumit Ganguly

Published: 9:45am, 17 Mar 2022

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On March 9, an Indian supersonic, surface-to-surface missile was accidentally launched from a firing range at Sirsa near the Pakistani border and landed in Pakistan near the city of Mian Channu. Fortunately, there was no loss of life even though some civilian property was damaged.

Two days later, Indian authorities expressed regret over the incident and attributed the inadvertent launch to a technical error. The Pakistani military said it was aware of the trajectory of the missile once it entered Pakistani territory. Not surprisingly, they also expressed considerable concern about this intrusion.

It is certainly reassuring that the launch of this missile into Pakistani territory did not lead to a response from its military. The fulminations of Pakistani National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf notwithstanding, the restraint of the Pakistani military was admirable. Had Pakistan either moved its forces closer to the border or resorted to other military manoeuvres, it could have easily escalated the situation.

In the Indo-Pakistani context, such fears are hardly chimerical. The two countries have fought four wars (in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999). In 1987, a major Indian military exercise, “Brasstacks”, almost culminated in a war between the two states.

The inadvertent missile launch into Pakistani territory also raises other questions. Specifically, it brings to the fore the robustness of India’s command and control apparatus over its missile, and possibly nuclear, forces. There is little information in the public domain about the structure of India’s nuclear command authority because of an acute penchant for secrecy about security matters.

How India and Pakistan became nuclear states

Based on public statements from prominent former officials and a handful of news releases, it appears that the nuclear force structure lies in the hands of civilian authorities. Furthermore, these statements also suggest that extensive drills are routinely conducted to ensure that the nuclear apparatus can respond with alacrity to any imminent threat.

Initially, the atomic energy establishment had day-to day custody of the fissile core of the nuclear warheads while warheads and missiles were the preserve of the uniformed military. More recently, however, evidence has emerged that missiles have been mated with warheads in a segment of the nuclear force. Beyond these features and a dispersed command authority, the nuclear weapons programme remains opaque.

People work around what Pakistani security sources say are the remains of a missile fired into Pakistan from India, near Mian Channu, Pakistan, on March 9. Photo: Pakistani security sources/Reuters

In the case of the accidental missile launch, apart from constituting a commission of inquiry to examine how it took place, the Indian government has not issued any statements about the safety and security of India’s nuclear and missile arsenals.

Merely stating that a “technical malfunction” led to the launch will do little to reassure a domestic audience let alone an adversary that is prone to assume the worst of its principal enemy.

Pakistan wants joint probe into India’s ‘accidental’ missile

Despite the deep-seated hostility that characterises India-Pakistan relations, both sides have a compelling interest in avoiding an inadvertent conflict. This is of particular importance because they are both overt nuclear-armed rivals. Fortunately, long before they carried out back-to-back nuclear tests in May 1998, they had embarked on the first set of nuclear confidence-building measures.

Since 1992, the two sides have, every January, exchanged a list of each other’s nuclear installations. This practice, despite a range of tensions and a war in 1999, has been uninterrupted. Beyond this, the two sides have also signed two important and pertinent agreements.

The first, reached in April 1991, calls for the pre-notification of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements. The second, concluded in October 2005, calls for the pre-notification of all ballistic missile tests. The latter, of course, is especially relevant to the present situation.

Since an accord on the pre-notification of ballistic missile launches is already in place, it may be in the interest of both parties to expand its scope. This would require either party to promptly and forthrightly inform the other in the event of an accidental launch.

In this photograph released by the Indian Defence Ministry on November 1, 2015, a BrahMos supersonic cruise missile is test-fired from newly-commissioned indigenous guided missile destroyer the INS Kochi. Photo: AFP

Since a nuclear hotline has existed since 2004 between the two highest foreign policy bureaucrats, its ambit could be broadened to include the issue of accidental missile launches. It is evident that, under the present circumstances, neither country is inclined to significantly constrain its extant nuclear and missile programmes.

More to the point, in light of last week’s episode, pursuing this additional confidence-building measure appears nothing short of imperative. On this occasion, Pakistan’s security establishment displayed remarkable restraint. Such composure may not prevail next time.

Sumit Ganguly is a distinguished professor of political science and Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington