Why the China-Solomon Islands pact is making waves in the Pacific
If Chinese security cooperation and economic largesse bring stability and prosperity to the islands, the message will resonate across the Pacific
However, the strong reaction of the region’s traditional powers could have a chilling effect on other countries eyeing a deal with China as domestic and international pressure rises
The Solomon Islands must have run out of red carpet after welcoming senior officials from Australia, the United States and Japan in quick succession.
The South Pacific archipelago might not have anticipated the intense reaction to its recent security agreement with China, especially from the region’s traditional powers. But while this accord was not China’s first foray into Oceania, a foothold in the Solomons will be a milestone in its long swim across the Pacific.
China has already become the world’s largest navy by number of ships, but a dearth of overseas bases constrains its blue water ambitions. Aside from one in Djibouti at the entrance to the Red Sea, which opened in 2017, the country has no other official bases abroad. In contrast, the United States has about 800 bases around the world.
As Beijing is not into formal alliances and permanent bases are controversial, it might seek to address its handicap by securing access agreements with geographically strategic countries. Coastal and island states of the Indo-Pacific are natural targets as they would provide the Chinese navy with ideal locations to set up logistics facilities, replenish supplies and temporarily house crews.
Such arrangements also help foster defence ties with host countries which can translate into arms sales, joint drills or patrols and even clandestine basing rights. From this angle, the China-Solomons security pact represents a breakthrough. However, the attention it drew means its implementation will come under severe scrutiny.
While China established official ties with the Solomon Islands in 2019, the new pact could provide some assurance to Chinese investors and tourists who may now flock to the country. Beijing is likely eager to reward Honiara for dropping its recognition of Taipei.
Turning the Solomons into a development showcase could vindicate Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s contentious gambit. The diplomatic switch exposed domestic cleavages between the central government and Malaita province, with the latter unhappy with the shift.
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China confirms signing of Solomon Islands security pact, as US warns of regional instability
China confirms signing of Solomon Islands security pact, as US warns of regional instability
If Chinese security cooperation and economic largesse bring stability and prosperity to the islands, the message will resonate across the Pacific – not least with Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic friends, notably the Marshall Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu. From the Solomons, China can better observe the maritime exercises and activities of rivals and project power across the Pacific.
If Beijing delivers and the archipelago becomes the Cambodia of the Pacific, the impact will not stop there. Other countries such as Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Kiribati – which Beijing has also courted – could also be interested in similar access agreements.
For the Solomon Islands, defiance in the face of pressure shows its resolve in diversifying its security partners. While reassuring Australia that it remains a partner of choice, the country is taking a leap of faith in engaging new partners even amid geopolitical rivalries.
Sogavare might be arguing that the Pacific family is not an exclusivist sphere of influence that precludes a member from seeking new friends to address persistent problems. Poverty, unemployment and lack of infrastructure have long plagued the Solomon Islands. Such instability was displayed in the unrest that rocked the capital Honiara in November.
The recent security agreement could enable the country’s police to better deal with domestic disturbances and open doors for China to send a contingent of multinational peacekeeping forces to restore order. But the Solomon Islands’ move is as much a signal to resident Pacific powers as it is to newfound partners.
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Solomon Islands riot sets Chinatown ablaze in capital Honiara as protests turn violent
Solomon Islands riot sets Chinatown ablaze in capital Honiara as protests turn violent
The accord is likely to compel mainstay Pacific players to revisit their development assistance programmes and climate change policies while recommitting to a region long regarded as a peripheral backwater.
If the Solomon Islands succeeds in playing off one partner against another to extract the most concessions, others in Oceania might follow suit. There are signs that entertaining Beijing’s overtures could be paying off.
Early this year, the US announced plans to reopen its embassy in the Solomon Islands after 29 years. Also, the Millennium Challenge Corporation will administer US$20 million worth of projects to support the country’s forestry and tourism sectors.
However, there was also a strong reaction from the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan to the security agreement. Canberra called the prospect of a nearby Chinese naval base a “red line”, and the matter has become a hot-button security and foreign policy issue in the May 21 federal elections.
Washington stressed the deal’s potential regional implications, arguing it would not rule out military action if it gave way to a base or power projection capability for Beijing. Wellington questioned the motives behind the deal given that Australia and New Zealand have responded to security appeals by the Solomon Islands, as shown in their dispatch of peacekeepers during last year’s disruptions in Honiara.
Despite the Solomons’ proximity to its overseas territory in New Caledonia, France surprisingly has yet to make known its views on the issue. Whether the silence is because of Paris’ preoccupation with its recent elections or lingering hurt feelings over the Aukus agreement between Australia, the US and Britain is anyone’s guess.
The noise generated by the deal portends difficult straits ahead for China’s desire to secure strategic access elsewhere in the Pacific. Tensions with Japan, souring relations with Australia, brewing rivalry with the US and differences over Russia’s war in Ukraine complicate Beijing’s broader maritime ambitions.
The ruckus could also have a chilling effect on other countries eyeing a deal with China as domestic and international pressures are now expected to heighten.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation, a fellow at the University of the Philippines Korea Research Centre and lecturer at the Chinese Studies Programme at Ateneo de Manila University
