Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sent diplomatic shock waves across the world in May with his announcement of an eight-nation voyage around the Pacific. What nation has ever showered such conspicuous time and attention on these tiny nations? While Western powers chewed their nails about the potential security implications, Pacific Island nations celebrated that a major power was at last taking seriously their concerns about climate change and sea-level rise. And, of course, it helped that Wang came bearing gifts , including helping to build infrastructure. On balance, there should have been no surprise – not because the visit reinforces China’s aspirations to be a voice in developments across the vast and largely empty Pacific Ocean, but because it illustrates different foreign policy priorities. How many noticed that Wang hotfooted it from the the Pacific to Nur-Sultan , the capital of Kazakhstan, to join last week’s China+Central Asia foreign ministers’ meeting? How many noticed that Wang’s first foreign trip every year is to Africa – this January, to Eritrea, Kenya and the Comoros in East Africa, and last year to Senegal in West Africa for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation? While most of us dedicate much attention to US President Joe Biden’s visit to South Korea and Japan for the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework , and to Nato and other US-Europe leaders’ meetings to address Russia and the urgent challenges of the invasion of Ukraine, few recognise that China’s diplomatic energies are pointed in very different directions – and that this has been consistently true for decades. US foreign policy priorities were largely forged during World War II, and focused on a small number of rich and like-minded Western governments that even today are the world’s dominant powers. Meanwhile, China’s foreign policy priorities have been engaged elsewhere, and are driven by different – mainly economic and defensive – objectives. A quick audit of leaders’ international travel itineraries over recent decades describes these contrasted priorities clearly. Since the 1930s, 20 US presidents have made over 300 visits to Europe and over 70 visits to neighbours Mexico and Canada, but have visited East Asia just 60 times – 44 of these visits to Japan and South Korea. Visits outside the rich Western economies have been recent, comparatively rare and driven by very specific, normally defence-related objectives. For example, when they were US president, Donald Trump, who made 19 international trip to 24 countries, and Barack Obama, who made 52 trips to 58 countries, did not visit Central Asia, although both visited US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since he took office as president, Biden has visited eight countries – six in Europe (UK, Belgium, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the Vatican) and two in Asia – Japan and South Korea. Chinese President Xi Jinping has in the past decade made 69 visits, and his direction of travel has been quite different. About 40 of these trips were within Asia, including 10 to Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. He has made 10 trips to Africa, including three to South Africa. His top seven destinations have been Russia (eight times), the US (four times), France, India, Kazakhstan and South Africa (all three times). The Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies summarises the distinct foreign policy priorities of Xi and his predecessor Hu Jintao as embodied in the slogan: “Great powers are key, the periphery is first, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateralism is an important platform.” In short, you ignore the great powers at your peril, but need to tend to your neighbours first, and must always self-identify with the developing world. You should always prefer multilateral discussion and settlement of international issues over bilateral approaches. China’s distinct foreign policy priorities are also reflected in foreign leaders’ visits to Beijing. As research by Australia’s Lowy Institute reflects, China has been much busier than the US in encouraging foreign leaders to come visiting – an average of almost 87 times a year under Xi, compared with Obama’s average of 56 and Trump’s average of 27. Even during the US’ efforts to coordinate the “war on terror” after September 11, foreign visits to the US peaked at over 70. China not only hosts more foreign visitors, but it hosts them from quite different countries. Ignoring the past two pandemic years during which China has shut itself off, Beijing has since 2010 hosted 23 state visits from Cambodia, 21 from Pakistan, 18 from Laos, 17 from Russia, 16 from Kazakhstan, 15 from North Korea and 14 from Kyrgyzstan – in short, neighbours first. Top Chinese official for Africa to visit debt-hit Zambia days after Xi call Comparing China and the US, China has since 2010 hosted about 285 state visits from Asian leaders and about 170 state visits from African leaders, while the US has hosted 90 and 80 respectively. China has also worked hard to build its “convening power” with events like the Belt and Road Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Beijing’s efforts are focused on the developing world rather than the rich West, with most concentrated on economic and development challenges, in contrast with the defence-related priorities of the US and its allies. Ironically, and probably a source of deep frustration in Beijing, these courtship efforts have so far borne frugal fruit – even among countries that depend heavily upon, and are intricately interlinked with, China. Pew research on trust in Southeast Asia found in 2021 that 67 per cent of people surveyed across the region trust Japan, 51 per cent trusted the European Union and 48 per cent trusted the US (a huge rebound from the crash in trust during the Trump era). But just 16.5 per cent trusted China. So despite its best efforts, China is not trusted and remains misunderstood and largely unloved – even in regions where diplomatic efforts have been exerted the most. This is powerfully explored in Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen’s fascinating new book Sinostan , which they beguilingly subtitle “China’s Inadvertent Empire”. Wang Yi’s grand tour across the Pacific may have rattled some Western diplomatic cages, but it seems clear that China’s journey to reshape the world of diplomacy and to build global trust and acceptance is set to be long, slow and faltering. David Dodwell researches and writes about global, regional and Hong Kong challenges from a Hong Kong point of view