
Central banks’ anti-inflation missiles make a global debt crisis seem inevitable
- The roots of the crisis go deeper than the financial shocks produced by Covid-19, the Ukraine war, inflation and rising interest rates
- Advanced economies, whose banks are significantly exposed to emerging markets, cannot shrug off the impending distress
Picture a situation in which one country is firing missiles at another in rapid succession and then lowers its firing rate a little, whereupon the attacked country feels relief that the situation is easing even though missiles already in-flight are about to rain down destruction.
Even if they did, there is little they could do. There is an awful sense of inevitability about the advancing debt crisis, and its roots go deeper than the series of financial shocks produced by Covid-19, the Ukraine war, inflation and rising interest rates.
The new shock is likely to be sudden and painful, and it is by no means impossible that a series of systemic crises could appear as lenders (chiefly, but not exclusively, banks) and borrowers (governments, corporations and households) all run into serious debt distress.
So, what happens when a rise in the cost – and reduction in the quantity – of money meets a situation of historically high debt? Something has to give.
In its most recent Global Debt Monitor published in May, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) in Washington observed that total global debt rose by US$3.3 trillion in the first quarter to a record of over US$305 trillion – mostly due to rising debt in China and the US.
The report revealed that debt accumulation is accelerating across all principal economic sectors – government, corporate and household – and that the situation is becoming especially acute in emerging markets and low-income countries.
Accumulation of debt mountains is not new. There are plenty of precedents. What is new is the size of this particular mountain, created by a tectonic shock to financial orthodoxy, liquidity creation and historically low real interest rates that produced a massive surge in loan demand.
Perversely, while inflation is driving the interest rate rises that are poised to burst the global debt bubble, it also increases the money value of national output and thus reduces the size of debt to GDP ratios. But this benefit is illusory against the damage of soaring absolute debt.
Asia is among those at risk. Corporate debt reached 140 per cent of gross domestic product in Vietnam and 116 per cent in South Korea, while household debt has climbed to 104 per cent of GDP in South Korea, 89 per cent in Thailand and 72 per cent in Malaysia in the first quarter of the year, according to the IIF.
Risk is by no means confined to Asia or emerging markets. As the International Monetary Fund noted in April, “the number of advanced economies with debt ratios larger than the size of their economy has increased significantly”.
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Advanced economies cannot shrug this off. Their banks are significantly exposed to emerging markets, in the case of the euro zone and the US, while Japanese banks have also stepped up emerging market lending. Emerging market banks themselves are overexposed to domestic government debt.
Sovereign, and to some extent bank, debt can always be “restructured”. But such restructuring is not so well established (or likely) in the case of corporate and household debt.
Debt distress is likely to be widespread. Who is to blame? A finger can be pointed at former US Fed chair Alan Greenspan for bailing out markets when the dotcom bubble burst 20 years ago with monetary expansion that subsequently went wild, until inflation exploded. The lesson may be that it’s best to take pain from excess right away and not try to stave off the day of reckoning.
Anthony Rowley is a veteran journalist specialising in Asian economic and financial affairs
