G7 priorities on Ukraine war and China will face pushback from Global South
- G7 efforts to set the international agenda for how to resolve the Ukraine crisis will be complicated by voices from South Africa to Brazil
- Meanwhile, US criticism of China’s ‘economic coercion’ rings hollow given that this behaviour is hardly unique to Beijing. Diplomats call it ‘economic statecraft’
For US President Joe Biden, the exclusive G7 grouping – comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States – has assumed critical importance, despite its awkward “rich country” credentials; it is what one European diplomat has called “the workhorse of Western cooperation”, whose shared concern is to defend the “free and open international order”.
These G7 agenda priorities – and the less noticed Jeddah and Xian meetings – provide a glimpse into the economic and strategic fragmentation that is developing as an increasingly multipolar world begins to supplant the unipolar hegemony that has since the creation of the post-war Bretton Woods institutions enabled the United States to set the rules for international political and economic relations.
First, Ukraine. The crisis created by Russia’s inexcusable invasion of Ukraine has evolved as a proxy for this fragmentation. While there is agreement on the tragic consequences for Ukraine and its people, and on the urgent need for an end to the conflict, there has been pushback against the Western narrative of an evil Russian President Vladimir Putin who must at all costs be defeated.
Many believe the need for peace overrides the need for victory, and are trying to lay the ground for compromise. Others across the developing world have argued that a war that may be an existential issue to countries in Europe is not a unique priority for nations further afield, which have fierce conflicts closer to home, and which resent rich-country tardiness in addressing the climate and pandemic crises that threaten us all.
Such a proliferation of leaders representing the Global South who believe they have interests to defend and voices that need to be heard will inevitably complicate G7 efforts to set the international agenda for how to manage and resolve the Ukraine crisis.
Biden’s second G7 priority was to forge agreement on the need to create a collective economic defence framework to manage “economic coercion” by China.
At the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Victor Cha says 18 countries and 123 companies have been the targets of such “economic coercion”. Research for the European Parliament complains of “administrative discrimination”, investment barriers, tourism restrictions and simple threats, which occur “behind the curtains”. A paper from the US Institute of Peace says these initiatives are “extralegal, informal, unilateral and meant to be deniable”.
While few challenge the details of this coercive activity, it is tougher to argue that it is distinctive Chinese behaviour. Diplomats worldwide have for generations called such activity “economic statecraft”, all part of the carrots and sticks of managing international power relations, alongside military coercion.
US efforts to single out China as a uniquely dangerous economic predator have drawn fierce criticism from Beijing. In a detailed rebuttal, China’s embassy in Georgia dubs the US “the inventor and master of coercive diplomacy”, pointing out that its use of “economic blockade, unilateral sanctions, military threats, political isolation and technical blockade” present “textbook cases of coercive diplomacy”.
Among friends at the G7, the US will undoubtedly attract sympathy on the “economic coercion” issue, but for many developing countries, this argument will look very much like the pot calling the kettle black. This fragmented multipolar world is likely to be more fractious and complicated – most of all for the G7 elite.
David Dodwell is CEO of the trade policy and international relations consultancy Strategic Access, focused on developments and challenges facing the Asia-Pacific over the past four decades.