Why China can’t afford to wait and see about economic stimulus
- The Chinese economy is operating significantly below its full potential despite the rosy year-on-year growth numbers
- With rising unemployment, worsening deflation and growing systemic risks, policymakers need to do what’s right for both economy and society
So what is holding Beijing back from taking the necessary steps to stop the economic bleeding? Below are a few possible explanations, along with my assessment of their validity.
In that scenario – which was also the working assumption of the market at the start of the year – policymakers would not have to contemplate any new stimulus until possibly well into 2024. The lack of foresight and planning for the current economic downturn could have contributed to the delayed action.
However, negative interest rate differentials – caused by diverging policies between the People’s Bank of China and the United States Federal Reserve – are only one driver of exchange rate and capital movements. A thriving economy and booming capital markets – supported by forceful policy easing – could boost investment at home and lure capital from abroad. With the economy and confidence successfully revived, I’m not convinced that the renminbi will do poorly and that capital will flee China.
Another argument against large-scale monetary easing is the need to protect banks’ interest margins. This is seen as necessary to motivate banks to continue lending in adverse economic conditions, and ensure a certain degree of profitability for them to offset potential bad loans from lending to property developers and local governments’ funding vehicles. Therefore, the argument goes, Beijing cannot cut interest rates too aggressively and risk instability in the banking system.
My rebuttal of this is that, in the absence of decisive policy actions, worsening economic conditions will strain borrowers’ balance sheets, making them more likely to default on their loans. However, if the authorities act earlier and more aggressively to bolster growth, defaults among borrowers would not rise as much or could even decline, saving the banks from ever having to use their capital buffer against non-performing loans.
Finding real solutions to joblessness among China’s youth
It doesn’t take a Nobel Prize-winning economist to know that the Chinese economy is currently operating significantly below its full potential despite the rosy year-on-year growth numbers. Failing to recognise this and refusing to provide what the economy needs to close its substantial output gap is, in fact, a dereliction of duty on the part of macroeconomic policymakers.
In other words, leverage should not be seen as a hindrance to policy easing, but as a reason Beijing needs to execute its policy differently this time to minimise unintended consequences. The key lies in shifting the focus of stimulus from property and infrastructure investment to consumption and innovation.
Making this paradigm shift won’t be easy, as it requires policymakers to abandon their old philosophy, and embrace something new and untested in China. These changes need to be introduced now if the Chinese economy is to be saved from a potentially painful and prolonged balance sheet adjustment, like the one that resulted in Japan’s lost decades.
Aidan Yao is a macroeconomist with more than 15 years of experience in both public- and private-sector organisations