Deepening cooperation between US, Japan and South Korea provides economic and strategic hedge against China
The recent Camp David summit is the result of efforts by Tokyo and Seoul to take coordinated action on shared security concerns over China and North Korea
The trilateral interaction with the US is Japan and South Korea’s geopolitical insurance against the risks associated with a more dominant China
The announcement last week by leaders of the United States, Japan and South Korea of a mechanism for trilateral consultation and coordination – in response to threats to any of their countries “from whatever source” – seems to be the embryo of a “mini-Nato” in East Asia. This move means China will not sleep peacefully.
Beijing sees the deepening of Japanese-South Korean ties as part of the US strategy to contain its rise through a vast network of alliances and partnerships. Consider, for example, the effect of a combination of US, Japanese and South Korean naval and missile forces conducting exercises near the entrance to the Yellow Sea and Bohai Gulf, the gateway to the Beijing-Dalian-Qingdao triangle, which forms the geographical core of China’s political and military power.
The Camp David summit between US President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was the result of renewed efforts by Tokyo and Seoul to try to set aside their historical disputes in the face of shared security concerns over China’s geopolitical assertiveness and North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities.
Pushed by the US, Japan and South Korea probably have a window of four years to cement their rapprochement. The time frame coincides with the remaining period in office for Yoon, who is risking his political capital at home to mend ties with Tokyo after relations deteriorated under his predecessor Moon Jae-in.
Japan and South Korea have long had tense interactions because of the Japanese colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula. Tensions skyrocketed after Moon rejected a 2015 arrangement on the “comfort women” issue.
During reciprocal visits in March and May, Yoon and Kishida moved to break the ice. They achieved a solution for compensation to victims of Japan’s wartime forced labour before and during World War II.
US President Joe Biden (centre) greets South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol (left) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on August 18 at Camp David, the presidential retreat near Thurmont, Maryland. Signs of warming ties and increased cooperation between Japan and South Korea, urged on by the United States, have caused concern among China’s leadership. Photo: AP
The Japanese government also lifted export controls on critical materials needed to manufacture semiconductors it had levelled against South Korea. In turn, Seoul withdrew its action brought against Tokyo at the World Trade Organization over what it considered illegal restrictions.
Building on their two previous meetings, Kishida and Yoon met together with Biden on the sidelines of the Group of 7 summit in Hiroshima in May. Among other results, the three leaders agreed to advance cooperation in sharing North Korea’s missile data in real time, a commitment confirmed during the talks at Camp David.
South Korea and Japan are united by the common imperative of preventing a revisionist China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia, and it is reasonable for them to remain under the security umbrella of an external balancer such as the US.
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Leaders of South Korea and Japan commit to stronger ties despite lingering historical disputes
Leaders of South Korea and Japan commit to stronger ties despite lingering historical disputes
Japan views China’s rise as a source of instability in East Asia and is prepared to take steps to curb it, even if it involves an economic cost. Tokyo has, for example, joined a US-sponsored ban on the sales of chip equipment to Chinese tech companies, a move that is impacting some Japanese exporters and has angered Beijing.
The Kishida administration plans to raise military spending to 2 per cent of GDP by 2027 to deal with challenges from China, North Korea and Russia. In particular, Tokyo wants to be able to launch counter-attacks on enemy bases in an emergency using “stand-off missiles” provided by the US.
Its geographical proximity to China, deep economic connections and Beijing’s influence over the North Korean leadership have long prompted Seoul to adopt a more nuanced approach to Chinese ascendance. Factors such as Beijing’s increasing military pressure on Taiwan – which Yoon has opposed, calling it an attempt to change the status quo in the region – and North Korea’s repeated missile advances are changing South Korea’s perspective.
South Korea understands the need for security cooperation with Tokyo to improve operational readiness against China’s military manoeuvres and North Korea’s projectiles. Reducing dependence on China’s economy by increasing bilateral trade and investment, and ensuring safe supply chains, is another common point in Japan and South Korea’s security equation.
Police patrol outside a Lotte Mart in Beijing on March 9, 2017, after China launched an unofficial boycott of South Korea over US plans to deploy an anti-missile shield on the Korean peninsula. Beijing banned Chinese tour groups from going to South Korea, hitting its tourist market and the duty-free shops of retail giant Lotte Group, which had been targeted for providing land for the defence system. Photo: AFP
Both have an interest in reducing the impact of possible economic coercion by China – Beijing has a track record of using this tool to advance its geopolitical agenda – and hedging against China’s slowing economy. This is why Tokyo and Seoul are working to create strategic synergy on semiconductors.
Samsung reportedly intends to build a microchip development facility in Yokohama, where the South Korean tech giant already has a research unit. Japan and South Korea have also reached a consensus on expanding collaboration in other critical fields, such as liquefied natural gas, space and biotechnology.
The two nations will also have to protect their reinvigorated security and economic cooperation from the risk of a possible U-turn by future left-leaning South Korean administrations or by Japanese governments pressed by conservative nationalist groups – particularly within Kishida’s Liberal Democratic Party – that oppose concessions on historical issues.
Disagreements over Japan’s colonial history will persist but will have less of an impact as a younger generation of leaders and citizens emerges and the perception of a China threat grows among Japanese and South Koreans.
Cooperation with the US and Japan is South Korea’s geopolitical insurance against the risks associated with a more dominant China. Any incumbent government in Seoul knows that US military deterrence in East Asia can only reach its full strength with the combined help of Tokyo and Seoul.
After all, despite Moon’s cautious approach to China, South Korea’s military budget has steadily risen during his tenure. The focus on a naval build-up suggests improving the country’s defences has more to do with possible disputes with China than a crisis with North Korea.
Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst
