People pass through a street decorated with Taiwanese flags in Kinmen, Taiwan, on December 18, 2023. Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections are scheduled for January 13. Photo: Reuters
Opinion
Emanuele Scimia
Emanuele Scimia
How multiple global challenges may limit Beijing’s options on Taiwan
Does Beijing have the political, military and economic muscle to simultaneously handle multiple global security challenges, and deal with Taiwan?
If the crises in Myanmar, Yemen and the South China Sea continue to worsen, that seems unlikely
Geopolitical overexposure could force China to continue accepting the status quo across the Taiwan Strait for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether incumbent vice-president William Lai Ching-te – whom Beijing considers a separatist – wins the island’s presidential election on January 13.
Beijing has festering troubles with the Philippines in the South China Sea and must cope with long-running strife between the Myanmar military and anti-coup rebels at its southwestern border. Plus, like the United States, China is not immune to the threat posed by Yemen-based and Iran-backed Houthi rebels to commercial ships transiting the Red Sea.
The US is dealing with multiple security crises at once. Washington has a stake in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Israel-Gaza conflict and its spin-offs in the Red Sea, Iraq and Syria while striving to contain China in the western Pacific.
While there are doubts as to whether the US can effectively support Ukraine against Russia and Israel against Hamas and its regional allies at the same time, does Beijing have the political, military and economic muscle to simultaneously handle three security challenges and then launch military operations against Taipei? That may be unlikely if the crises in question continue to worsen.
Tit-for-tat skirmishes between China and the Philippines are continuing in the South China Sea, where the two sides are locked in territorial disputes. Last week, two Chinese warships shadowed Philippine and US vessels conducting joint patrols in the strategic waterway, according to the Philippine military.
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Philippine coastguard removes Chinese barrier at disputed Scarborough Shoal in South China Sea
Philippine coastguard removes Chinese barrier at disputed Scarborough Shoal in South China Sea
This was the second combined operation by the two allies in less than two months in the West Philippine Sea – the official designation by Manila of the waters in the South China Sea falling within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.
In the meantime, Chinese sources suggest the Philippines is set to launch another resupply mission to its garrison aboard the BRP Sierra Madre. The wrecked landing ship is grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands which China claims as its own. If that happens, Beijing can be expected to attempt to intercept the operation.
Philippine lawmakers have also recently allocated funds for building a permanent military structure on the Second Thomas Shoal. This, combined with the prospect of more joint naval patrols between the Philippines, the US and other friendly countries, risks further fuelling tensions with China.
Unlike the US, China has a war on its doorstep. Armed conflict between the local military and rebel groups has surged in Myanmar’s northeast region, which borders China’s Yunnan province, since late October. China filed a protest with Myanmar’s armed forces earlier this month after stray artillery shells injured five people on Chinese territory.
Beijing has some influence on both Myanmar’s generals and some armed groups operating along the border and has sought to facilitate dialogue between the two sides, although its efforts have so far been in vain.
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Myanmar faces its biggest challenge yet to its rule amid recent setbacks in war with rebel groups
Myanmar faces its biggest challenge yet to its rule amid recent setbacks in war with rebel groups
Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said on January 4 that China would take the necessary steps to safeguard the lives and property of its citizens. China’s embassy in Myanmar had previously advised its nationals to leave the Laukkai area because of increasing security risks.
It is reasonable to assume Beijing does not want to remain directly entangled in the civil war gripping its neighbourhood. However, the situation in Myanmar’s Kachin and Shan states, once a buffer zone inhabited by large groups of ethnic Chinese, risks spinning out of control.
Repeated clashes between the two warring parties would threaten more Chinese people and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor if they expand, with displaced people fleeing toward the Chinese frontier. If that happens, Beijing could be forced to conduct its own “special military operation” in Myanmar’s territory to reestablish the buffer.
Further away, between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, ongoing attacks by Houthis on commercial vessels they consider connected to Israel are a headache for the US and its allies. There are suggestions China could benefit from the disruption of this maritime corridor as the China-Europe rail link could become a viable alternative.
Protesters hold a large Palestinian flag during a rally against a multinational operation to safeguard Red Sea shipping, in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, on January 5. Photo: EPA-EFE
An estimated 12 to 15 per cent of global trade passes along the route, with more than 60 per cent of Chinese goods reportedly shipped to Europe through the Red Sea in 2021. Yet, there is insufficient capacity for such a land re-routing, not to mention that transporting freight by rail is more expensive.
It was no coincidence that Chinese carmaker Geely warned on December 22 that attacks in the Red Sea would be likely to delay shipments of electric vehicles to Europe. China thus has an interest in securing the safe passage of goods via the Red Sea, given that the attacks by Yemeni rebels are forcing cargo ships to take longer and more costly routes.
China has said it will not join the combined naval task force led by the US to protect commercial vessels navigating the waterway, but it could use its anti-piracy mission in the region to defend Chinese ships. If the conditions are right, the PLA Navy could still find a way to cooperate with the US-sponsored multilateral coalition.
“More power means more responsibility,” former US president Barack Obama said about China in 2016. It also means more risks for Beijing, which is starting to experience life in Washington’s shoes and feel the burden of being a superpower – in this case, possibly to Taipei’s benefit.
Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst
