Having learned from the 1997 crisis, Asia’s currency defence is likely to be prudent and eclectic
- Asian economies are in a much better state today, more able and willing to tolerate currency depreciation, which can act as a shock absorber
- To slow it down, Asia could use an array of instruments, from interest rate increases and opportunistic currency interventions to piecemeal capital-flow management
Most importantly, the share of short-term, unhedged foreign currency debt is lower than 25 years ago. This was Asia’s Achilles’ heel in 1997, as massive currency devaluations suddenly inflated external debt. Indonesia’s external debt obligations, for example, skyrocketed to 153 per cent of GDP in 1998 from 56 per cent in 1996. In contrast, a larger share of external debt today is denominated in local currency.
The region, however, still faces challenges, with no easy policy options. Asian inflation might not be as high as elsewhere, but it is still high and policy interest rates have been slow to adjust, evidenced by much lower, and in most countries, still deeply negative real interest rates. Noticeably higher domestic private debt in most economies also makes them more sensitive to higher interest rates than before.
Asian market turmoil today is not a repeat of 1997 financial crisis
Asian central banks are not single-mindedly focused on inflation, realising that raising rates too rapidly to contain inflation could trigger a domestic financial fallout. But policymakers also seem more mindful of economics’ impossible trinity, which allows for the combination of only two of the following by any country at any time: fixed exchange rates, free capital flows, and independent monetary policy.
Such an approach would include measures such as raising interest rates to tolerate some further currency depreciation, while opportunistically intervening in foreign exchange markets to reduce expectations of a one-way depreciation, coordinating between central banks and governments to avoid fiscal dominance – where high government debt holds back central bank functions – and activating a second line of defence that involves piecemeal capital-flow management measures to slow down depreciation.
While the region does face some stress points, if Asian policymakers stay the course on prudent policies and an eclectic response to the impossible trinity, the region will be well positioned to lead the next global economic recovery.
Rob Subbaraman is head of global macro research and co-head of global markets research at Nomura. Si Ying Toh is an economist for Asia ex-Japan at Nomura