China codifies ethnic assimilation with new ‘unity’ law as it counters the West

China has passed a new law on ethnic unity, creating a legal framework that analysts say is designed to counter Western ideological influence and provide a statutory mandate for assimilating the country’s minority groups. The Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress was formally endorsed by the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislature, at the end of the annual “two sessions” on Thursday. The law was adopted by a near-unanimous vote of 2,756 in favour, with just three against and three abstentions. The NPC also approved other major legislation and resolutions with overwhelming support. The Ecological and Environmental Code received only seven votes against and three abstentions. The outline of the 15th five-year plan for national economic and social development (2026-2030) was approved with one vote against and two abstentions. The resolution on the 2026 central and local budgets, which prioritises spending on science development, diplomacy and national defence, likewise passed with high support, receiving 11 votes against and six abstentions. Li Hongzhong, vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, told the lawmakers last Thursday that the law sought to transform the ideas and successes in ethnic unity and progress since 2012 into legal provisions and used legal measures to prevent and resolve “major risks and hidden dangers” related to ethnic issues. Its passage coincides with the roll-out of China’s 15th five-year plan, which calls for “accelerating high-quality development in ethnic regions” and “consolidating the sense of community for the Chinese nation”. With a preamble and more than 60 articles across seven chapters, the law codifies President Xi Jinping’s instructions on ethnic unity. It establishes core principles, legal safeguards and cultural foundations to foster a “shared spiritual home” and promote harmony within the Chinese nation, according to the final approved version released late on Thursday. The law will take effect in July. It links ethnic affairs policies to an “overall national security perspective” and has provisions to “protect the dignity of national symbols”, including the national flag, anthem and emblem, while also emphasising the role of patriotic education. According to analysts, Beijing has framed ethnic governance as part of a broader ideological struggle with the West, using legislation to both manage internal risks and counter external attempts to politicise its policies. Beijing continues to face international scrutiny of its approach towards China’s ethnic minorities, especially in the Tibet autonomous region and the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. An editorial in Qiushi, the ruling Communist Party’s leading theoretical journal, on Tuesday said the party’s work on this front still faced challenges such as imbalances in regional development, complex ethnic interactions and external interference. “While the foundation for a Chinese national community is solidifying, ideological struggles in the ethnic field remain complex and acute, and the risk of international forces interfering in and undermining China’s ethnic unity should not be underestimated,” it wrote. Jinghao Zhou, an associate professor of Asian studies at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, said China was strengthening its “core advantages” in competing globally by turning the goal of national unity from an ideal into a legal requirement. National unity was the “bedrock” of China’s power, enabling “seamless mobilisation of resources and public support”, he said, adding that Beijing could not project global power if it were “weakened by domestic friction”. Zhou said the law would “further promote a unified multi-ethnic country to serve as a strategic counter-model to the divided, broken democratic societies of the West, where political polarisation and cultural fractures often resulted in legislative gridlock and inconsistent foreign policy”. Peter T.C. Chang, a visiting senior fellow with the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said the law was gaining passage amid “growing geopolitical tensions”. Chang said the law was framed not merely as a domestic matter but “reflects a strategic shift, from reactive responses to international criticism towards a more proactive legal defence of China’s approach to ethnic governance”. According to Barry Sautman, a specialist in China’s ethnic minorities and professor emeritus at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Beijing might become “more insistent on an end to Western accusations of genocide, crimes against humanity, forced labour, forced intermarriage, arbitrary detention”, among other issues. Sautman suggested that China’s representatives might actively rally other countries to unite against Western criticisms in international forums. A notable clause in the new legislation was the introduction of public interest litigation regarding ethnic unity, an inclusion actively advocated by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, said Yang Jianbo, its head of law and policy research, on Saturday. Article 54 stipulates that where acts “damage national unity and progress, harm national interests or the public interest”, prosecutors may file a public interest lawsuit. Previously used in environmental protection or consumer rights cases, this expansion grants prosecutors the standing to intervene judicially when they deem ethnic unity to have been breached. Sautman said possible cases could relate to Tibet, where officials might sue parents for encouraging a son to leave school and join a monastery, and in Xinjiang, which has 15 years of compulsory education. He said that under the new law, legal action might be taken against parents who pressured their children to drop out after middle school as the state moved to make senior high school attendance universal. Sautman said the law’s passage reflected China’s previous experience in Xinjiang. He noted that the region’s issues with terrorism and religious extremism were largely addressed through not only security measures but also rapid socio-economic growth during the latter half of the decade. In Tibet, “sharp increases” in development levels and “youth bilingualism” had led to a decline in unrest and self-immolations that previously made international headlines, he said. But critics warn that the aggressive promotion of the national standard language in ethnic minority areas threatens to erode local languages and cultural identities. In recent years, controversial policies have been introduced in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, such as Chinese replacing Mongolian as the main medium of instruction for core subjects, stricter oversight of Mongolian cultural and artistic expression, and the repeal of local laws that do not align with the ethnic affairs policy. Beijing has defended its approach, saying it seeks to balance the preservation of minority identity with national integration to ensure stability, a message reaffirmed in the new ethnic unity law. Comparisons between the law’s initial draft from September last year and this month’s final version revealed a hardening on several issues. In Article 15, for instance, a new sentence advises schools and educational institutions to use standard Chinese as the fundamental language for teaching, defining standard Chinese as the country’s “statutory common national language”. Meanwhile, public organisations that need to use both the national standard language and minority languages on public occasions are to give prominence to the former in terms of positioning and order. This comes just months after the first amendments in 25 years to the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language took effect on New Year’s Day. According to Chang, the new law promoting ethnic unity still affirms the protection of minority languages and cultures, though it places them in a “secondary role” compared with the national standard language. As with many multi-ethnic and multicultural countries, such as Malaysia, China’s emphasis on a single main language of education reflected Beijing’s view that “a shared national language was essential for economic mobility, administrative integration and social cohesion”, said Chang, a former deputy director of the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya. The framework promoted functional bilingualism – Chinese for education and public life, and minority languages for cultural preservation – though the long-term balance would depend on local authorities’ implementation, he added. Fei-Ling Wang, a professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, said the law formalised a transition away from a Soviet-inspired model of nominal ethnic autonomy towards a framework that prioritised national integration, cohesion and “assimilation”. Wang added that China’s present policy was heavily influenced by lessons learned from the Soviet Union’s collapse, leading Beijing to prioritise a single overriding national identity over the formal recognition of separate ethnic nationalisms to prevent fragmentation. “Beijing has increasingly prioritised assimilation over pluralist accommodation,” he said. “Yet paradoxically, by more explicitly codifying assimilationist measures, the law may actually amplify foreign criticisms, especially among governments and people who interpret it as further constraining minority rights, cultural diversity and religious freedom.” Additional reporting by Jane Cai

China codifies ethnic assimilation with new ‘unity’ law as it counters the West

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Legal safeguards heed Xi Jinping’s call to foster ‘shared spiritual home’ with an eye on staving off ‘domestic friction’, analysts say

Legal safeguards heed Xi Jinping’s call to foster ‘shared spiritual home’ with an eye on staving off ‘domestic friction’, analysts say