Why the Philippine-US Kamandag war games are a balancing act for Duterte

Over 2,400 troops from the Philippines, US and Japan are currently taking part in an annual military exercise
But after his recent visits to China and Russia, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte must balance commitments to the country’s traditional ally without upsetting new partners

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

Published: 6:00pm, 15 Oct 2019

Why you can trust SCMP

The third annual Kamandag military exercises could not have come at a more critical time, with the Philippines expanding its China and Russia ties, highlighted by President Rodrigo Duterte’s recent fifth visit to Beijing and second visit to Moscow, and the United States abandoning its Kurdish allies in the war against terror in Syria, casting doubts over the reliability of US alliance commitments.

Over 2,400 troops – 900 Filipinos, 1,400 American and 100 Japanese – are undergoing several exercises in selected locations across Luzon, the country’s biggest island, and Palawan from October 9 to 18. Kamandag, which literally translates to venom in Filipino, is shorthand for “Kaagapay Ng Mga Mandirigma Ng Dagat,” or “Cooperation of Warriors of the Sea”.

The exercises demonstrate how the 68-year old alliance between the US and the Philippines can weather challenges in bilateral relations and respond to a changing security environment. For Washington, the exercises support a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific, where its long-standing influence is increasingly being challenged by a resurgent China. For Manila, the exercises are an opportunity to sustain engagement with a traditional ally as it diversifies its foreign policy.

US Marines talk to Philippine Marines during a joint military amphibious landing exercise. Photo: EPA-EFE

Joint exercises include counterterrorism, amphibious and aviation operations, live-fire training and urban combat. For the first time, there will be low-altitude air defence and threat reaction training.

Manila last month acquired eight amphibious armoured vehicles from South Korea in a move to strengthen its amphibious capabilities, and the exercises provide a good opportunity to put these to the test.

Despite earlier threats of upending the war games with the country’s former coloniser and long-time treaty ally, Duterte seems to appreciate the value of the alliance. Notwithstanding his tirades against the West for its criticisms against his drug war, security cooperation with the US remains robust, although kept low-key. In fact, it even broke some new ground. While internal and non-traditional security threats have become the new centrepieces of the exercises, the maritime and external dimension cannot be missed.

Why don’t Manila and Beijing have closer military ties, after Duterte’s China pivot?

Kamandag replaced the annual Philippine Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX) with the US which was scrapped, although Kamandag and other maritime-themed exercises have come to the fore.

In January and July, both sides engaged in Marine Aviation Support Activities (Masa). Last April, the annual bilateral Balikatan exercises also featured amphibious landing exercises. In July last year, a maritime training activity named “Sama-Sama” (Together) was held off Poro Point, La Union facing the West Philippine Sea. And in July 2017, joint patrols were conducted in the Sulu Sea to combat piracy and seaborne transnational crimes. This came a month after “Sama-Sama” 2017 was conducted in the waters off Central Visayas, focused on maritime domain awareness and capacity building to arrest piracy and smuggling.

New Philippines military chief sees no ‘shooting war’ in South China Sea

Under Duterte, Manila withdrew participation from the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training (CARAT), a series of annual maritime exercises US conducts with regional navies. However, it continued to take part in the US-led Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training Exercise (SEACAT), a platform for engagement for coastguards from Southeast Asian and South Asian countries. In fact, Manila hosted SEACAT 2017 and 2018, while the final phase of SEACAT 2019 was held off the former US naval base of Subic.

With the emergence of a multipolar world order, keeping long-standing allies and expanding partners are twin imperatives

Last May, for the first time in seven years, a US Coast Guard cutter, the USCG Bertholf, made a port visit to Manila before conducting exercises with its Philippine counterparts in waters close to Scarborough Shoal. And last July, a US navy ship, the USS Montgomery, paid a visit to Duterte’s hometown of Davao. The number of bilateral exercises also increased from 261 in 2017 to 281 the following year.

The Kamandag exercises represent the continued security cooperation that has become the bedrock of the post-war bilateral alliance. The 2018 exercises also marked the first time Japanese armoured vehicles rolled out on foreign soil since the end of World War II. It was an opening by Manila that will certainly not be lost on Tokyo. The exercises gave Manila a greater role in influencing the direction of the security ties, with an emphasis on counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief coinciding with the country’s vulnerabilities.

Top military officials from the Philippines, US and Japan link arms during the opening ceremony of the Kamandag 2019 exercise. Photo: EPA-EFE

Kamandag can be seen as part of that delicate balancing act that Duterte has to carefully tread. While reaffirming the country’s commitment to its treaty ally, he must do so without upsetting expanding relations with its largest trade partner. Indeed, with the emergence of a multipolar world order, keeping long-standing allies and expanding partners are twin imperatives. Central to that will be cultivating good ties with major powers including the US, Japan, China and Russia. If successful, Duterte may go down in history as a Philippine leader who was able to successfully steer his country through tumultuous times.

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation. He is an analyst on Asian connectivity and security affairs and is presently pursuing his MA International Affairs at American University in Washington.

Post