German government and military officials recently revealed plans for the first German naval voyage to East Asia since 2002, in the wake of the country’s new Indo-Pacific guidelines. Amid increased French and British presence in the region – and explicit invitations from Germany’s partners, Japan in particular – this year’s trip is much less of a signal to Beijing than it is a message of support to Berlin’s allies. The voyage was first publicised in 2019 when the frigate Hamburg was selected to conduct joint exercises with India and Australia from May the following year, though this did not proceed further because of the Covid-19 pandemic . Then, last September, the foreign ministry published the Indo-Pacific guidelines, which outline a shift towards increased German naval activity in the region, from more liaison officers to the presence of naval vessels. Life after Merkel: China-Germany ties face the unknown Under the guidelines, plans for the German frigate Bayern now encompass a wide range of activities with allied nations and organisations. These include participation in Nato’s Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean, to the European Union’s Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa, followed by passage through the Strait of Malacca towards Australia, participation in the United Nations ’ sanctions against North Korea, as well as passage through the South China Sea on her way home. With the US-China rivalry showing no signs of abating, there has been a stark increase in Western military activity in the disputed waterway – including a French submarine patrol in February and the planned deployment later this year of the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and her multinational carrier group, which is set to include vessels from the United States and the Netherlands. The deployment of a German frigate could thus seem like Berlin’s contribution to the Western effort of constraining China – but it is not there yet. The German foreign ministry has emphasised its insistence on a rules-based order, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and its recognition of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that China had no legal basis or historical claim on the South China Sea through its nine-dash line. However, the seemingly harsh gesture of a transit through the waterway was tempered by a comment from within German government circles that no passage within 12 nautical miles of any Chinese-occupied features is intended. A German ministry of defence spokesperson added that the Bayern would follow international shipping routes. Passages to refute Chinese territorial claims that actively challenge the 12 nautical-mile zone have so far only been conducted by the US. Germany thus finds itself in the company of its European allies, who are transiting in greater distance. However, while the first passage of a German ship through the South China Sea in almost 20 years is a message in itself, not revealing this navigational intention could have been beneficial in its signalling to Beijing. Keeping the Chinese side uninformed about possible courses through the disputed waterway as well as its proximity to Chinese-occupied features would have been a more tangible rejection of Chinese authority in the region, without any confrontational action. German foreign minister Heiko Maas is known for adopting a tough stance on China, from his meeting with Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong in 2019 to his recent support for a common German-US strategy to push back “wherever Russia, China or others are threatening our security and prosperity, democracy, human rights and international law”. Still, despite growing tensions between Berlin and Beijing, and occasional confrontations over Hong Kong and Xinjiang , Germany was the dominant country pushing for the EU-China investment agreement signed in December – an agreement that might ultimately fail to be ratified in the European Parliament amid Chinese sanctions against several of its members. Beijing hopes Germany will continue China-friendly approach Germany’s China policy has always been primarily economic. Only in recent years has there been a gradual realisation that the guiding principle of Sino-German relations, “change through trade ” or “Wandel durch Handel”, was not going to deliver the hoped-for effects. No amount of trade and economic cooperation was able to move Beijing even an inch closer to Western liberal values, neither domestically nor internationally. However, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government has been reluctant to change course. But Berlin does not only maintain a rather uncritical, business-heavy relationship with Beijing. Like France and Britain, among others, Germany has over the past decades actively contributed to China’s military build-up. It delivered dual-use goods – in particular diesel submarine propulsion plants that do not fall under the 1989 arms embargo, imposed by the EU on China following the crackdown in Tiananmen Square , that are powering the entire Type-039 Song-class of submarines. So how credible is a German show of force to Beijing, if it does not reflect Germany’s general policies? Frigate Bayern is neither one of the newest, nor the strongest of Germany’s major surface combatants and as such limited in her role as a deterrence factor. Yet despite the countries’ previously good ties, she is not exempt from Chinese hypersensitivity regarding the South China Sea. In an instant reaction Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesman Wang Wenbin implicitly warned Germany not to challenge Chinese sovereignty and security. Beijing’s recent sanctions against European lawmakers and the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies, Europe’s biggest China think tank, have further taken the bilateral relationship to a new low. As the naval mission progresses, further, more explicit statements from the Chinese side are to be expected. Another critical question regarding Germany’s new commitment is whether this is a one-time transit or whether it would be capable of repeatedly dispatching units or even maintaining them overseas. Germany has previously been quite transparent concerning the limits of its naval capabilities, also due to the parliamentary oversight of the armed forces. Then, in 2019, Ursula von der Leyen, at the time German Minister of Defence, reclassified the annual reports on readiness of the Bundeswehr (as Germany’s armed forces are known) as “secret” after she came under scrutiny for the questionable condition of some of Germany’s major weapon systems. The reports had revealed that in 2018, none of Germany’s six submarines had been serviceable for a period of five months, alongside large numbers of tanks and fighter aircraft. For 2020, the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces reported that of 15 major surface combatants, only nine were actually serviceable. Meanwhile the delivery of the new F125 class of frigates has been repeatedly delayed, taking each unit between five to six years from launch to commissioning. On top of that, the German Navy has been understaffed for years, leading to worsened working conditions especially for ship crews. The fulfilment of Germany’s ongoing obligations such as the two Standing Nato Maritime Groups, EU operations Irini and Atalanta as well as Nato’s Sea Guardian already take up much of the navy’s resources, yet the understaffed arsenals further expand the ships’ maintenance periods. Congruently the Inspector General of the German Armed Forces, Eberhard Zorn stated that the Bayern was selected due to her availability, and thus not due to her features. Diverging opinions on the merit and value of the mission do nonetheless exist in Berlin. Maas’ party colleague, Ralf Mützenich, chairman of the governing Social Democratic Party’s parliamentary faction, opposed the mission, stating that Germany should stick to diplomatic means instead. Tobias Lindner, spokesman for security policy of the oppositional Green faction, said that beyond symbolic actions like the frigate a European China-strategy is needed. While the deployment is a certain cause for irritation in Beijing, it does set itself apart from other Western missions in the region, due to its multilateral design. Germany could have chosen to participate in HMS Queen Elizabeth’s carrier group or accompanied one of the regular French transits. Yet, it was decided that for this comeback Germany would not align itself with other European powers and their vested interests in the region, but instead would set its own priorities in accordance with its local partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. It will be a detail of great interest for observers, to see in which constellation European navy vessels will visit the Indo-Pacific in the future. The South China Sea dispute explained The German vessel in the South China Sea is less of a signal to Beijing – a rather unimpressive one at that – and more clearly a message aimed towards its local partners and allies. Minister of Defence Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer explicitly named Australia, Japan, South Korea , and Singapore , but the gesture will be particularly welcomed by the US. Japanese fear of a shifting power balance has not only led to a strengthening of its navy, but also revived its defence cooperation in the region and beyond. As Japan and Germany recently signed an intelligence sharing agreement, the indicators accumulate that Germany is starting to take a stance that goes beyond policy papers and conference speeches. To its major allies, Germany is demonstrating that no matter how far away they are, it wants to be there to support them. The mission shows that European countries do not need territories in the Indo-Pacific, to have a defined interest in the fate of the region. The German Indo-Pacific strategy explicitly states that might cannot make right in the Indo-Pacific and that Germany is willing to help enforce the rules-based order. How it wants to reconcile this ambition with its hesitance to stand up to China’s assertive actions in violation of said rules-based order remains to be seen. The eve of the Merkel administration may create room for a realignment of the German China policy, the first sparks of which we are beginning to see this year. Currently, the composition of Germany’s next government is far from certain. Largely due to major mismanagement in the Covid-19 pandemic, Merkel’s party – the Christian Democratic Union of Germany – keeps losing public support, the oppositional Greens are rising and the co-governing Social Democrats have stabilised at a low level. Multiple coalitions are possible after the elections in September and each of the major parties has their very own stance on China, most differing from Merkel’s economy-based non-confrontationism. Considering its materiel and personnel constraints, the dispatch of the frigate Bayern underlines a new kind of dedication in Germany’s foreign policy. But if the Federal Republic truly aims to become a relevant naval power in the Indo-Pacific, it must carefully balance ambition and resources to avoid overstretch. Arnaud Boehmann is a sinologist from Hamburg, Germany. Currently he is specialising in East Asian security policy at S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies in Singapore